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Abstract
The first chapter in my thesis investigates the association between selected hedge fund
characteristics and persistence in performance over time. Analyzing TASS data from 1996-2006,
I observe a positive correlation between persistence in good performance and fund size, as well as
age. Furthermore, I find that more illiquid investment strategies exhibit significantly stronger
persistence in good performance, both in the short and long run, even after controlling for
illiquidity risk. These results indicate that higher fund size, age, and exposure to illiquidity are
reflective of superior managerial skill. Finally, I note that funds with higher incentive fees display
greater persistence in both good and bad (post-fee) performance in the long run. These findings
are consistent with a scenario in which incentive fees are raised by both skilled and unskilled,
(but lucky), fund managers in response to good past performance. Therefore, my analysis
suggests that incentive fees for hedge funds may be endogenously determined.
The second chapter tests a simple explanation for momentum profits: systematic
outperformance arises because certain stocks have persistently strong fundamentals which are not
fully valued by the market. We find that "winner" portfolios have higher book-to-market ratios
than "loser" portfolios, and the economic and statistical significance of momentum profits is
markedly reduced when calculated above value benchmarks. A large component of the returns to
relative strength portfolios may thus stem from such portfolios overweighting high value stocks,
suggesting a close relation between the value and momentum anomalies.
The final chapter develops a measure of international financial contagion using a semi-
structural approach. In particular, we work with a multi-country dynamic equilibrium setting,
placing a constraint on portfolio volatility. The tightening of this constraint is a channel through
which shocks are propagated globally in our model. We then derive a measure of the tightness of
the constraint, or 'contagion', using cross-equation restrictions. We finally evaluate our measure
of international contagion with regards to its predictability on global asset price co-movement, as
well as on news about the recent sub-prime crisis. We find evidence that our contagion estimator
is a strong measure of the sub-prime crisis in this regard.
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Hedge Fund Characteristics and Performance
Persistence
Pavitra Kumar1
May 2 3rd 2008
Abstract
This paper investigates the association between selected hedge fund characteristics and
persistence in performance over time, both in the short and long run. Analyzing data from
the TASS database over the period 1996-2006, I obtain evidence of a positive correlation
between persistence in good performance and fund size, as well as age. Furthermore, I
find that relatively more illiquid investment strategies exhibit significantly stronger
persistence in good performance, both in the short and long run, even after controlling for
illiquidity risk and short-term positive serial correlation. These results provide support for
the argument that higher fund size, age, and exposure to illiquidity are reflective of
superior managerial skill. Finally, I observe that funds with higher incentive fees display
greater persistence in both good and bad (post-fee) performance in the long run. These
findings are revealed to be consistent with a scenario in which incentive fees are raised
by both skilled and unskilled, (but lucky), fund managers in response to good past
performance. Therefore, my analysis sheds light on a potential mechanism through which
incentive fees for hedge funds are endogenously determined. My investigation also
highlights the differences between trends in performance persistence displayed by the
mutual fund and hedge fund industries.
1 Pavitra Kumar is from the Sloan School of Management, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, E52-458, Cambridge,
MA 02142-1347, pavitra.kumar@gmail.com. I would like to thank Manuel Adelino, Jack Bao, Alex
Edmans, Dirk Jenter, Jiro Kondo, Andrew Lo, Jun Qian, Roberto Rigobon, Oleg Rytchkov and participants
of the MIT Finance Lunch for helpful comments and discussion. All errors are my own.
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, there have been numerous studies of hedge fund performance that
attempt to investigate persistence in excess returns. The issue of performance persistence
is particularly significant in the hedge fund industry, given that investors are increasingly
willing to pay extremely high fees to bet on persistent 'alpha', or outperformance of the
market benchmark. Investors in hedge funds also often face substantial lockup periods,
and as a result, it is crucial for them to be able to assess the future stability of funds'
performance in advance. This task, however, is very difficult, given the lack of
transparency in the hedge fund industry. Indeed, investors can usually only observe past
fund performance, and past good performance by itself is rarely a reliable indicator of
future persistence in excess returns. Therefore, the main contribution of this paper is to
analyze which hedge fund characteristics, as well as investment strategies, contribute to
the strongest persistence in performance over time, both in a short run (two-period) and
long run (multi-period) setting. As well as looking at the effect of different investment
styles, the hedge fund features I choose to examine are size, (measured by a fund's initial
net asset value at the start of the sample period), age, (measured by the number of
monthly performance observations reported by a hedge fund since the earliest
performance observation within its fund family 2), management fee and incentive fee
structure.
My analysis has several useful implications for developing lucrative investment
strategies in the hedge fund industry. In particular, a knowledge of which fund-specific
factors are associated with long run persistence in good performance would be especially
beneficial for investors in open-ended hedge funds, (or funds that remain open to new
investors for a significant period of time after being set up). Another key motivation
behind my study is to highlight the differences in performance persistence trends
displayed in the mutual fund and hedge fund industries. For example, there is a far
greater degree of persistence documented amongst hedge funds relative to mutual funds,
(see Section 2 for a literature review). My major contribution is then to explain this
2 As mentioned in Aragon (2006), many funds in the TASS database belong to the same management
company, so it is important that a spinoff fund of a well-established management company is not classified
as young.
finding by highlighting differences in characteristics between the mutual fund and hedge
fund industries, (such as hedge funds employing more illiquid investment strategies and
charging much higher incentive fees3), and showing how these particular characteristics
affect persistence in both good and bad performance amongst hedge funds.
The main line of reasoning behind all my hypotheses is that superior (lower)
hedge fund manager skill should be associated with better (worse) performance in any
given period. Thus, since skill is itself an intrinsic quality that is likely to be persistent
over time, I propose that superior (lower) managerial ability should be associated with a
higher degree of persistence in good (bad) performance as well. I then hypothesize that
my selected hedge fund characteristics reflect skill in various ways. Firstly, taking the
characteristics size and age, it seems reasonable to expect that, on the one hand, managers
of larger and older funds are more highly skilled since they are clearly capable of
attracting higher capital inflows and keeping their funds alive for a longer period of time.
This argument would generate the prediction of a positive monotonic relationship
between size, as well as age, and persistence in good performance. On the other hand,
decreasing returns to scale is a widely reported trend in the mutual fund and, to a lesser
extent, the hedge fund industry as well. In the hedge fund industry in particular, the threat
of scale diseconomies often forces funds to cap their size at a certain optimal level and set
up smaller spinoff funds instead. This would at least partially eliminate the effects of
decreasing returns to scale on their performance. Given the significantly higher skill
required to ensure survival in the hedge fund industry, however, and also given far
weaker evidence of scale diseconomies compared to the mutual fund industry, I propose
that higher hedge fund size is primarily reflective of superior skill, rather than decreasing
returns to scale. This would imply that even after controlling for size-capping, or
allowing for scale diseconomies, one should still observe a positive (negative)
relationship between size, (as well as age), and persistence in good (bad) performance.
These trends are indeed confirmed by my results in both the two-period and multi-period
3 Hedge funds usually charge much higher performance-based fees, (generally a combination of
'management fees' on the assets, on average 1-2%, and 'incentive fees' charged as a percentage of net
profits, on average around 20%), than mutual funds, which mostly do not charge performance-based
incentive fees at all. Hedge funds also use investment techniques that are forbidden for mutual funds,
including 'short selling' stock, using high levels of leverage, and investing in highly illiquid or esoteric
securities which do not have to be marked-to-market daily, (a strict requirement for mutual fund portfolios).
settings. This provides a contrast to strong findings of decreasing returns to scale in the
mutual fund industry, (see Section 3 for further details).
Regarding the effect of performance fees on persistence, I develop a scenario,
realistic to the hedge fund industry, in which investors cannot distinguish between funds
which have performed well in the past, and are either genuinely skilled in generating
persistently high alpha, or have unskilled managers and have simply produced good
performance due to luck. If one then assumes that investors are rational, and thus both
classes of funds attract an inflow of new funds in response to similarly good past
performance, they should also both have an incentive to raise performance fees to extract
the highest possible investor surplus. Therefore, on a post-fee basis, one would expect to
see funds with higher incentive fees generating stronger persistence in both good and bad
performance over several periods, reflecting the skilled and unskilled hedge fund
managers respectively. Strikingly, I do observe this relationship when analyzing multi-
period persistence. This suggests that the level of incentive fees in the hedge fund
industry could be endogenously determined in response to past performance. This
prediction would not hold in the mutual fund industry, however, given that high incentive
fees are exclusive to hedge funds.
Finally, I examine the effect of different investment strategies on performance
persistence. Here, I refer to the evidence in Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) that
greater exposure to illiquidity produces more significant short-term positive serial
correlation in monthly hedge fund returns. One would expect this trend to translate into
greater overall persistence for more illiquid strategies in the short run setting. However,
one might also expect that higher fundamental skill is required when implementing
trading strategies in more illiquid and complex securities. As a result, I propose that, even
after netting out the effect of higher illiquidity risk premia4 for some investment
strategies, more illiquid funds should still generate significantly higher persistence in
good performance, and this relationship should be discemable in the long run or multi-
period setting as well. This is in fact what I find in the data. This prediction would again
4 See Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Aragon (2006) for evidence of pricing of illiquidity risk in the
hedge fund industry.
not hold in the mutual fund industry, given that high illiquidity is far more prevalent in
the hedge fund industry.
In summary then, my findings in this study are consistent with the concepts I
develop to explain certain features of the hedge fund industry. Moreover, I observe that
several significant trends in performance persistence hold in the multi-period setting as
well as in the two-period framework. This is a very powerful result, given that persistence
found in a multi-period setting is far less likely to be generated by chance.
I perform my analysis in this paper using monthly (post-fee) returns of hedge
funds in the TASS Database from January 1996 to March 2006. I start by replicating the
standard methodology of Agarwal and Naik (2000b). Based on the Agarwal-Naik model
where the fundamental risk faced by hedge funds is determined by their investment
style5, I construct two monthly measures of abnormal performance. I then test for overall
persistence of risk-adjusted returns in a two-period framework using both non-parametric
(contingency table based) and parametric (regression based) methods. In the multi-period
setting, I use a 'two-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov' (K-S) test to detect significant
differences between the observed distribution of returns for individual hedge funds and
the theoretical distribution under the assumption of no persistence. My specific
contribution to the existing literature follows from sorting hedge funds into quintiles
based on size and age. I also rank funds into three groups based on the level of their
incentive and management fees6. I then examine two-period and multi-period persistence
in abnormal returns of funds across the quintiles/groups for each characteristic, and
across the eleven investment strategies classified by the TASS database. In addition, I
develop a measure to analyze separately the impact of these characteristics and strategies
on persistence in good performance and persistence in bad performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review on performance persistence in the hedge fund industry. In Section 3, I provide a
more detailed description of my main hypotheses. Section 4 provides a description of my
5 The TASS database classifies funds into 11 different investment styles or 'primary categories'. These are
reported in Appendix A as: 'Convertible Arbitrage', 'Long/Short Equity Hedge', 'Event Driven', 'Fund of
Funds', 'Multi-Strategy', 'Global Macro', 'Emerging Markets', 'Managed Futures', 'Fixed Income
Arbitrage', 'Equity Market Neutral', and 'Dedicated Short Bias'.
6 I classify funds into three categories instead of quintiles here in order to separate them into 'low',
'moderate' and 'high' fee categories.
sample. In Section 5, I examine the effect of the various characteristics of hedge funds on
persistence in performance in the two-period setting. Section 6 extends the analysis to the
multi-period framework. Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
I firstly examine the literature on performance persistence in the mutual fund industry. In
particular, Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993), Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlava (1993)
and Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) all find evidence of persistence in mutual fund
excess retums. Brown and Goetzmann (1995) also obtain evidence of persistence that is
mainly driven by repeat losers rather than repeat winners. Carhart (1997), however, uses
a 'four factor' model, (the standard three factor Fama-French model with the addition of
a performance attribution factor for momentum strategies), in order to examine mutual
fund performance persistence between 1962 and 1993. He reports that mutual funds do
not earn significantly positive risk-adjusted returns relative to his augmented model, thus
providing evidence that common factors in stock returns almost completely explain away
persistence. Nevertheless, as discussed by Berk and Xu (2004), even the Carhart model
cannot justify the persistent underperformance of the worst performing mutual funds over
the last ten years or so. Therefore, there does appear to be consistent evidence from the
literature that suggests that any persistence in the mutual fund industry is primarily driven
by consecutive losers. Apart from this finding though, there is no evidence of any other
clear trends in persistence over the last few decades.
By contrast, findings of performance persistence in the hedge fund industry are
far more widespread, although some of the standard methods used to test for persistence
have produced conflicting results in the literature. The most common approach to
examining persistence is to use non-parametric and parametric (or regression based) tests
in a two-period setting, and a Kolmogorov-Smimov (K-S) test in a multi-period
framework. Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), for example, use an offshore hedge
fund database and find that year-by-year cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund
'alphas', or excess returns, on past excess retums do not indicate performance persistence
for the sample period 1989 to 1995. On the other hand, Agarwal and Naik (2000a) select
their sample from the broader HFR database. Using a multi-factor 8-index model to
generate estimates of excess hedge fund returns between 1994 and 1998, they do obtain
significant evidence of persistence in hedge fund performance at quarterly and half-
yearly horizons.
Agarwal and Naik (2000b) extend their performance persistence tests from a two-
period framework to a multi-period setting, now using a one-factor benchmark model and
a sample period of 1982 to 1998. They observe that the degree of persistence decreases as
the return horizon they use increases, and that persistence is mainly driven by consecutive
losers rather than by winners. Furthermore, they note that the extent of persistence over
several periods is not related to the investment strategy of a particular fund. Finally, the
level of persistence found in the multi-period setting under a Kolmogorov-Smimov test is
significantly lower relative to the two-period framework, and there is a complete absence
of persistence using a one-year return horizon, (at both the 5% and 10% significance
levels).
Koh, Koh and Teo (2003) lend further support to these findings with their
investigation of persistence in excess returns of Asian hedge funds, (both pre- and post-
fee'), which they also find to diminish as the return horizon exceeds six months. Similar
results are obtained by Capocci, Corgay and Hubner (2003), who find no persistence in
annual risk-adjusted mean returns from the MAR database for the best and worst
performing funds. In particular, in the hedge fund literature, only Caglayan and Edwards
(2001), Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek (2002) and Kouwenberg (2003) actually find any
evidence of significant persistence at a yearly horizon.
Caglayan and Edwards (2001) conduct quite a different study of persistence in
hedge fund performance over the period 1990 to 1998. They use a six-factor model to
obtain estimates of Jensen alphas for individual hedge funds in the MAR database. They
apply their analysis to hedge funds following eight different investment styles, and in
contrast to Agarwal and Naik (2000b), report that the magnitude and persistence of
7 This follows the suggestion by Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) that persistence is displayed in
pre-fee returns, and managers can be fully compensated for this through performance fees. However, given
that fees are not paid during the year and are instead imputed, this adjustment may generate a spurious
persistence in returns measured at horizons less than a year. Therefore, in order to test this, Koh, Koh and
Teo (2003) and Agarwal and Naik (2000b) perform their persistence tests on both pre-fee and post-fee
returns.
excess returns differ significantly across these strategies. They also find evidence of
persistence amongst both repeat winners and losers over one-year and two-year horizons;
this contradicts several of the findings in the mutual fund and hedge fund literature
summarized so far.
Overall, one notes from a study of the literature that the most widely used non-
parametric test for persistence over the last eight years is the cross-product ratio (CPR)
test. (The test is based on a two-way winner and loser contingency table analysis). This
approach is also used by Agarwal and Naik (2000a and 2000b), Caglayan and Edwards
(2001), Kat and Menexe (2002), Koh, Koh and Teo (2003) and DeSouza and Gokcan
(2004). Furthermore, looking at the various performance measures used in the hedge fund
literature, one observes that the most common method of measuring excess returns is to
use a one-factor benchmark model, (where fundamental risk is determined by the
investment strategy of a hedge funds), or to estimate relative risk-adjusted returns using a
multi-factor model9. In my paper, I adopt the former approach of measuring abnormal
returns for all hedge funds.
3. Hypotheses
As described in Section 1, my hypotheses are mainly derived from the reasoning that my
selected hedge fund characteristics reflect managerial skill in various ways. One would
expect superior (lower) hedge fund manager skill to be associated with better (worse)
performance in any given period. Thus, since skill is itself intrinsic and likely to be
persistent over time, I propose that superior (lower) ability should be associated with a
higher degree of persistence in good (bad) performance as well.
There have been several past studies of the relationship between these hedge fund
characteristics and performance. For example, De Souza and Gokcan (2003) perform
8 This method is used by Agarwal and Naik (2000b), Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), and Park
and Staum (1998).
9 Baquero, ter Horst and Verbeek (2002) and Kat and Menexe (2002) estimate relative risk-adjusted returns
for the hedge funds in their samples, (both of which are obtained from the TASS database). Caglayan and
Edwards (2001), Capocci, Corhay and Hubner (2003), Kouwenberg (2003) and Boyson (2003b) follow the
same procedure, using a multi-factor model.
regressions on the TASS database in order to examine which characteristics of hedge
funds affect performance, (but not persistence in performance over time). They find that
assets under management, a proxy for the size of a hedge fund, is positively related with
performance. They also find that older funds outperform younger funds on average,
suggesting a positive relationship between age of a fund and ability of managers to ensure
survival. One can infer from these results that managers of larger and older funds are
more likely to be highly skilled and capable of keeping their funds alive for a longer
period of time. Thus, the natural implication is that one should observe a positive
(negative) relationship between age, as well as size, and persistence in good (bad)
performance.
On the other hand, decreasing returns to scale is also a trend that exists in the
mutual fund and, to a lesser extent, the hedge fund industry as well. Chen et al (2002), for
example, find that size significantly erodes performance in the mutual fund industry, and
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2006) find that larger hedge funds with greater inflows are
associated with poorer future performance, as well as a lower persistence in good
performance. This latter result in particular is consistent with the argument that larger
hedge funds with large money flows may find it difficult to generate high returns, since
they may be unable to deploy their entire capital into certain trading strategies that are
restricted by the size of the market. Therefore, these factors suggest that, at least beyond a
certain threshold, one should observe a negative relationship between hedge fund size
and persistence in good performance.
Thus, I have outlined two factors, the 'skill' effect and decreasing returns to scale,
which generate opposite predictions about the expected relationship between size and
performance persistence. In my investigation, I use two measures of fund size to address
this issue. The first measure, for a given fund, is its initial net asset value at the start of
the sample period. The second measure is the maximum initial net asset value across all
funds in the same management company or fund family. I use this latter measure to adjust
for the practice of 'size-capping', which would at least partially erase the effects of
decreasing returns to scale on hedge fund performance. (In particular, in order to control
for size-capping it is important not to classify spinoff funds in any given fund family as
being smaller than the parent fund. My alternative measure of size specifically adjusts for
this). Given the significantly higher skill required to ensure survival in the hedge fund
industry, however, and also given far weaker evidence of scale diseconomies compared
to the mutual fund industrylo, I propose that higher hedge fund size primarily reflects
superior managerial skill, rather than decreasing returns to scale. One would therefore
expect to see a positive association between size, (as well as age), and persistence in good
performance, even after allowing for diseconomies to scale, or controlling for size-
capping. In other words, this relationship between size and persistence should hold using
both measures of size outlined above. This would provide a contrast to strong findings of
decreasing returns to scale in the mutual fund industry.
I base my hypothesis about the relationship between incentive fees and
performance persistence on a scenario in which managers raise fees in response to good
past performance. Firstly, I note that De Souza and Gokcan (2003) find a positive
correlation between incentive fees and performance in their hedge fund study. The
standard justification for this result is that funds generally attract a higher inflow of funds
after good performance", (as a reward for greater skill), and more skilled managers may
consequently charge higher incentive fees to capture a greater surplus from investors. It is
worth recognizing, however, that luck, as well as managerial skill, also potentially plays a
significant role in determining performance of hedge funds over time. Therefore, it is
natural to expect that investors, who are only able to observe past performance of hedge
funds, cannot actually distinguish between funds which have performed well in the past
and have genuinely skilled managers, and funds which have unskilled managers and have
produced similarly good performance due to luck. Furthermore, if one assumes that
investors supply capital competitively to funds, (and are fully rational, so that high fund
performance is interpreted as a signal of high managerial ability), then this creates a
10 There is mixed evidence of decreasing returns to scale in the hedge fund industry. While Agarwal, Daniel
and Naik (2006) find evidence of decreasing returns to scale in their study of flows and performance,
several other studies, including De Souza and Gokcan (2003), Amenc, Curtis and Martellini (2003) and
Getmansky (2004), observe that larger hedge funds significantly outperform smaller funds in terms of
excess returns. Findings of decreasing returns to scale in the mutual fund industry, on the other hand, are
far less ambiguous. See for example Chen et al (2002) who find that size significantly erodes performance
in the mutual fund industry, and Berk and Green (2004) who use decreasing returns to scale as a key
assumption in their model of rational mutual fund flows.
1' See Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2006) for an investigation of the relationship between fund flows and
past performance. In particular, they find that funds with good recent performance do indeed experience
higher money-inflows.
scenario in which capital flows are responsive to past performance as well. This is
because, in equilibrium, capital will simply flow to investments in which it is expected to
be most productive; thus, the better the performance of a fund in a given period, the
higher the expected inflow of funds for the next period, and vice versa'2. Coupled with
the assumptions described above, one would then expect both skilled, and unskilled but
lucky funds to receive the same high inflow of funds from investors.
Following on from this discussion, it is intuitive to argue that the greater the
inflow of new capital to a fund, the greater should be the incentives of managers to raise
performance fees in order to extract the maximum surplus, (or alpha), from investors.
Thus, the implication in this scenario is that both skilled, and unskilled but lucky funds
should raise their incentive fees to the same high level, after realizing similarly good past
performance. While the funds with skilled managers would be significantly more likely
to continue to perform well over several periods, however, even on a post-fee basis, one
would eventually expect the funds with lucky but fundamentally unskilled managers to
report persistently below-average performance in the long run, after deducting their high
fees. Therefore, the major prediction generated by this model is that higher incentive fees
should be associated with a higher degree of persistence in both good and bad (post-fee)
performance, and this relationship should be most discemable in a multi-period
framework'3.
Turning finally to the relationship between investment strategies and performance
persistence, there appear to be mixed results in the hedge fund literature. For example,
De Souza and Gokcan (2004) use both non-parametric and regression based approaches
12 See Berk and Green (2004) for a rational framework in which this relationship holds.
13 There is further evidence in the data to support this hypothesis. In particular, I obtain all hedge fund data
from the TASS database, which classifies funds into 'Live' and 'Dead' databases. The most common
reason for death of a fund is prolonged poor performance, which is in turn most likely associated with poor
managerial skill. Therefore, if my hypothesis is true, higher incentive fees can signal both higher skill, and
poor skill in conjunction with luck. Consequently, one would expect higher incentive fees for any given
fund to increase the probability of dying. I test this proposition by running a logistic regression, where the
dependent variable takes the value 1 if a fund is in the Dead database, and 0 if it is still living. The
regressor is the level of incentive fees across all funds in the sample. When performing this regression, I
obtain a significantly positive coefficient on incentive fees at the 5% level. In particular, a one standard
deviation increase in incentive fees, (calculated across all funds in the sample), generates a 0.2% increase in
the probability of dying on average. The coefficient on incentive fees remains positive, although not
statistically significant, when controlling for size, age, management fees and volatility of returns over the
sample period, and also when including investment strategy dummies. Therefore, these findings do provide
additional support for my hypothesis that higher incentive fees generate higher persistence in both good and
bad performance over time.
to test for persistence in the HFR database. Using non-parametric methods, they obtain
no evidence of persistence in Sharpe ratios and raw average returns at the three-year
horizon across all hedge fund investment strategies. Regression based tests, however,
display significant evidence of persistence in Sharpe ratios for 'Convertible Arbitrage'
and 'Equity Market Neutral' strategies. Similarly, Kouwenberg (2003) finds evidence of
persistence in Sharpe ratios and alphas amongst 'Event Driven', 'Market Neutral' and
'Global' funds in the late 1990s.
One line of reasoning which could explain why certain hedge fund investment
strategies display significantly more persistence than others is related to the relative
liquidity of the securities that they trade. In particular, Getmansky, Lo and Makarov
(2004) investigate a similar topic in their paper, developing an econometric model of
return smoothing in order to suggest that illiquidity exposure generates significant
(positive) serial correlation in monthly hedge fund returns, at least in the short run, (i.e.
for a lag of up to approximately six months). They then examine the distribution of
estimated smoothing coefficients, (which act as a proxy for quantifying illiquidity
exposure), across 17 different investment strategies. The authors observe that a certain
group of investment categories, (comprising 'Fixed-Income Directional', 'Convertible
Arbitrage', 'Event Driven', 'Nondirectional/Relative Value' and 'Pure Emerging
Markets'), display significantly more smoothed returns, and are thus much more likely to
trade illiquid securities. On the other hand, another group of strategies comprising 'US
Equity Hedge', 'Global Equity Hedge' and 'Pure Managed Futures', is shown to display
less retum-smoothing. These results are consistent with common intuition that these last
three strategies, especially 'Managed Futures', involve relatively more liquid securities
with well-established, not easily manipulated, markets.
Given that Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) find that greater exposure to
illiquidity produces more significant short-term positive serial correlation in hedge fund
returns, one would also expect funds in more illiquid investment strategies to display
higher overall persistence in a short run framework. Following this particular reasoning,
the strategies in my sample that are likely to be most persistent are 'Convertible
Arbitrage', 'Event Driven', 'Fixed Income Arbitrage' and 'Emerging Markets'. The
opposite result would be expected to hold true for the 'Managed Futures' category. One
would not, however, expect higher positive serial correlation to be a driving factor in the
relationship between illiquidity exposure and long run performance persistence. This is
because it is a short-term effect that disappears for horizons greater than six months. A
more plausible version of this hypothesis in the multi-period setting, which accounts for
underlying endogeneity in the selection of certain investment strategies by hedge funds,
is that more highly skilled managers may signal their ability by choosing more complex
and illiquid strategies. This would generate a positive relationship between illiquidity
exposure and persistence in good performance in the long run, even after controlling for
illiquidity risk. This is the final hypothesis that I test in my paper.
4. Sample Description
This paper uses the TASS database, which as of March 2006 lists 6542 funds, (including
2487 'Graveyard' or 'Dead' funds, and 4055 'Live' funds), with at least one monthly net
return observation14 . In my analysis, I consider monthly returns from January 1996 to
March 2006.
As described in Fung and Hsieh (2000) and Liang (2000), which also use TASS
for their analysis, there are numerous data biases that can arise when analyzing reported
hedge fund returns from this database. These include survivorship bias 15 and instant
history bias16. Therefore, in replicating the analysis of Agarwal and Naik (2000b) on the
TASS database, I follow their strategy of modifying the sample in order to minimize
these potential biases, applying it to my analysis of monthly returns. Specifically, I
include both live and dead firms in my sample, (from 1996-2006), in order to adjust for
the survivorship bias problem. In order to mitigate the instant history bias, Fung and
14 In TASS, most returns are reported net of fees on a monthly basis. Returns are defined as the change in
net asset value during the month, divided by net asset value at the beginning of the month.
15 This is reported to be an annual value of 2.24 % by Liang (2000), and 3 % by Fung and Hsieh (2000).
The bias arises from the fact that the TASS 'Graveyard' database only became active in 1994, so that funds
dropped from the 'Live' database before 1994 are not listed in the 'Graveyard' database. Therefore, prior to
1994, failed funds are excluded because they no longer exist. This would generate an upwards
'survivorship' bias in mean returns, (and most likely a downward bias in return volatility as well). I control
for this problem by including both live and dead funds in my analysis, for the post- 1994 period 1996-2006.
16 This (upward) bias in returns is generated by the back filing of earlier returns for a fund that has been
newly introduced into the database. It is estimated by Fung and Hsieh (2000) to be as high as 1.4 % for
average annual hedge fund returns in TASS.
Hsieh (2000) and Agarwal and Naik (2000b) follow a standard procedure of excluding
the first period's observation of returns for all hedge funds in the sample. In my analysis,
however, I use a very short time-period of one month 17. Therefore, merely excluding the
first month of returns for all hedge funds would have a minimal impact on reducing the
back filing bias in my sample. Consequently, in order to implement a more substantial
adjustment for the instant history bias, I exclude the first year of returns for each hedge
fund, (which is a more standard practice). I also exclude all funds with a return history of
under two years, and all funds that report returns on a quarterly basis, do not report
returns net-of-fees, or do not quote US dollars as their base currency.
After restricting my sample period to January 1996-March 2006, and completing
the modifications outlined above, my final sample is composed of 4287 funds; 2611 live
funds and 1676 dead funds. Table 1 contains a descriptive analysis of my sample,
providing the numbers of live and dead funds in each of the 11 investment categories
classified by the TASS database, as well as in each of the quintiles based on size and age.
I also separate funds into 'Low', 'Moderate' and 'High' 8s management and incentive fee
groups; the number of live and dead funds in each of these groups is reported in Table 1
as well. Table 2 displays the total number of funds within each of the 11 investment
strategies for each of the five size and age quintiles, (reported in Panel A), and for each of
the three incentive and management fee groups, (shown in Panel B). Finally, Panel A of
Table 3 reports the cross-sectional mean, median and standard deviation of size and age
within each of the investment strategies.
5. Two-period Tests of Performance Persistence
In this section, I analyze performance persistence in a two-period or short run setting. As
in Agarwal and Naik (2000b), I make the assumptions that excess returns are measured
relative to a benchmark model where systematic risk is determined by a hedge fund's
17 My motivation for using such a short return period is that given the evidence in Agarwal and Naik
(2000b) that the extent of performance persistence declines significantly with the return horizon, it appears
that the effects of different hedge fund characteristics on persistence would be highlighted most clearly by
using as short a return interval as possible.
'
8 These classifications are based on standard categorizations of high, moderate and low performance fees
in the hedge fund literature. See Table 1 for further details.
investment strategy or 'primary category'. In particular, as previously mentioned, TASS
separates hedge funds into 11 different primary categories. One can classify these
strategies further into 'directional' investment strategies, which exploit broad market
movements, and 'non-directional' strategies, which exploit specific short-term market
inefficiencies while hedging out as much market exposure as possible. (See the Appendix
for classification and description of these investment styles). As can be inferred from the
descriptions above, directional strategies are typically highly correlated with the market,
whereas non-directional strategies are market-neutral and display low correlation with the
market.
The motivation for using this particular benchmark model comes from the fact
that different hedge fund strategies have been shown in the literature to imply
significantly varying risk-return tradeoffs. As suggested by Brown, Goetzmann and
Ibbotson (1999) and Agarwal and Naik (2000a), for example, hedge funds can be
exposed to extremely different levels of fundamental risk depending on whether they
follow a directional or non-directional strategy, and even depending on which specific
investment category they fall into. Furthermore, the widely documented non-normality19
of hedge fund returns implies that any other standard linear multi-factor model would
most likely be an inadequate measure of risk. Therefore, as in Agarwal and Naik, (2000a
and 2000b), I benchmark funds' performance based on the investment strategy they
follow, (generating eleven benchmark measures). The major benefit of benchmarking
funds' performance based on investment strategy is that this allows one to control for
potential differences in illiquidity risk premia across the different primary categories.
Aragon (2006) provides evidence that illiquidity risk is priced in the hedge fund industry,
so it is important to adjust for this when analyzing the relationship between illiquidity
exposure and persistence in performance.
As a first measure of performance, I define the 'alpha' or excess return of a given
hedge fund as its monthly return minus the equal-weighted average monthly return for all
hedge funds in the sample following the same investment strategy. Using an equal-
weighted average here allows me to control for the fact that some investment strategies,
(in particular, the 'Fixed Income Arbitrage' category, as can be seen in Panel A of Table
"9 See Fung and Hsieh (1997).
3), may contain outlier funds with substantial initial size. Therefore, a value-weighted
average would place too high a weight on these outlier funds when calculating the
benchmark. As a second measure, which I also adopt in my analysis, the monthly
'appraisal ratio' 20 for a hedge fund is defined by Agarwal and Naik (2000b) as the alpha
divided by the residual standard deviation resulting from a regression of the hedge fund's
returns (throughout the sample period) on the average monthly returns of all the hedge
funds following that strategy. Panel B of Table 3 reports the cross-sectional mean,
median and standard deviation of the time-series averages of alphas and appraisal ratios
across all funds in each of the investment strategies classified by TASS. One notes from
this table that although the cross-sectional means of the performance measures are
generally negative for all the investment categories, (as well as overall), standard
deviations are extremely high in comparison. In fact, the overall standard deviation of
appraisal ratios per month is more than ten times higher than the absolute mean appraisal
ratio across all hedge funds in the sample. Therefore, it is difficult to draw any significant
inferences here about funds' relative average performance across the investment
strategies, as well as about their overall performance.
My analysis of persistence in a two-period setting involves two standard methods,
parametric and non-parametric. In order to conduct the parametric test of persistence, I
run a month-by-month cross-sectional regression of hedge fund alphas (appraisal ratios)
on alphas (appraisal ratios) during the previous month. For each month, a significantly
positive slope coefficient on past alpha (appraisal ratio) indicates persistence in
performance. I then take a time-series average of the estimated slope coefficients for the
month-by-month cross-section regressions, and perform t-tests on these averages 21. I also
conduct the same tests using standard errors corrected for serial correlation, or Newey-
West standard errors; this is an important adjustment given findings of monthly serial
return correlation in Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004).
On the other hand, the non-parametric method is based on constructing a two-way
contingency table of winners and losers, where a particular hedge fund is defined as
20 The appraisal ratio measure is thus adjusted for differences in volatility and leverage across hedge funds
in different investment categories. It is effectively a measure of hedge fund alpha per unit of idiosyncratic
risk. The use of the appraisal ratio as a performance measure can be dated back to Park and Staum (1998),
who examine persistence in performance of hedge funds in the TASS database from 1986-1997.
21 See Fama and Macbeth (1973).
being a winner in a given month if its alpha (appraisal ratio) is greater than the median
alpha (appraisal ratio) of all funds following the same strategy in that month. Individual
hedge funds are then described as displaying 'persistence' if they are either winners or
losers in two consecutive months, denoted respectively as WW and LL; (winners in the
first period and losers in the second are denoted as WL and vice versa). One can detect
persistence in alphas and appraisal ratios using a CPR (cross-product ratio) test, which
compares the observed frequency distribution of consecutive wins and losses for each
hedge fund with the expected frequency distribution under the null hypothesis of no
persistence. In particular, the CPR is defined as (WW*LL)/(WL*LW), where WW, LL,
WL and LW now denote the total number of funds which are consecutive winners,
consecutive losers, winners in the first period and losers in the second, and vice versa,
summing across all the months in the sample period. Thus, the CPR is the 'ratio of funds
which show persistence in performance to the ones which do not' 22, and under the null
hypothesis of no persistence this ratio should be equal to one. One then constructs the Z
statistic, which tests whether the logarithm of the CPR is significantly greater than zero,
by taking the ratio of the logarithm of the estimated CPR to its standard error. This
statistic has a standard normal distribution under the null23.
In order to break this analysis down further and examine separately whether there
is significant persistence in performance driven by repeat winners, (i.e. persistence in
good performance), or persistence driven by repeat losers, I construct my own analogous
'winner' ('loser') CPR test. The purpose of these tests is to detect significant differences
between the observed frequency distribution of consecutive wins (losses) for each hedge
fund and the expected frequency distribution under the null of no persistence. The cross-
product ratios used for these tests are, respectively, defined as (WW/WL) and (LL/LW).
(Corresponding standard errors and Z statistics are constructed analogously to those
described above).
In Tables 4 and 9, I report the results of non-parametric and parametric analyses
respectively, testing for persistence in both alphas and appraisal ratios across the whole
sample of funds, (and also across the various primary categories, size and age quintiles
22 See Agarwal and Naik (2000b)
23 See Agarwal and Naik (2000b) for further details on the construction of this test statistic.
and fee groups defined previously). I start by examining the results of the non-parametric
persistence tests on my sample. In Table 4, one can see that for all hedge funds, we can
reject the null hypothesis of no persistence in alphas and appraisal ratios at the 1% level
of significance. Furthermore, a few cross-sectional trends emerge from the reported log
cross-product ratios. Firstly, there is strong overall evidence of persistence, (in both
alphas and appraisal ratios), across all primary categories at the 1% level of significance,
except for in the 'Managed Futures' category. Moreover, testing for the significance of
the differences between log cross-product ratios of funds in different strategies, (reported
in Tables 5-7), one observes from Table 5 that the 'Convertible Arbitrage' and 'Fixed
Income Arbitrage' strategies display the strongest evidence of overall persistence at the
(one-sided) 1% level. In other words, both these strategies exhibit a significantly higher
degree of overall persistence than all other primary categories at the 1% level, (excluding
each other). I obtain similar results when I examine persistence in good performance,
reported in Table 6, and persistence driven by losers, reported in Table 7. The finding of
these trends for this recent sample period contrasts with the results of Agarwal and Naik
(2000b), who claim that performance persistence is not related to investment strategy
when analyzing hedge fund returns from 1982-1998.
These results provide evidence in support of my hypothesis that illiquidity
exposure is positively associated with overall persistence in the two-period setting, even
after controlling for differences in illiquidity premia across the various investment
strategies. In particular, the 'Convertible Arbitrage' and 'Fixed Income Arbitrage'
categories fall within the class of most illiquid hedge fund strategies identified by
Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004). In addition, I observe that the primary categories
which display the weakest evidence of overall persistence are those which trade in
relatively more liquid securities, namely the 'Managed Futures' strategy. In this two-
period test, however, when analyzing the relationship between illiquidity and persistence,
it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of managerial skill and the fact that higher
illiquidity is merely inducing higher short-term positive serial correlation in returns.
Turning to the analysis of hedge fund characteristics, and examining the
significance of log cross-product ratios once again in Table 4, one can see that funds in
all age (and size) quintiles exhibit significant evidence of overall persistence at the 1%
level, as well as persistence in wins and losses. Testing for the significance of the
differences between log cross-product ratios across the age quintiles, one notes from
Table 6 that the funds in the lowest age quintile exhibit the least significant evidence of
persistence in wins compared to all other funds at the 1% level, followed by funds in the
second lowest age quintile. Furthermore, there is a negative monotonic relationship
between age and significance of persistence in losses displayed in Table 7, using
appraisal ratios as the performance measure. In particular, funds in the lowest age quintile
display the most significant persistence in losses relative to all older funds, (at the 1%
level), followed by funds in the fourth and middle age quintiles, and then funds in the top
two age quintiles. The generally positive (negative) relationship here between age and
persistence driven by repeat winners (losers) supports my hypothesis that age is
positively related with skill.
One observes similar trends across the size quintiles in my analysis. In particular,
using appraisal ratios as the performance measure, one observes from Table 6 that funds
in the lowest size quintile generate the weakest evidence of persistence in wins at the 1%
level. The smallest (largest) funds also exhibit the most (least) significant evidence of
persistence driven by repeat losers in Table 7. Once again, these findings provide
evidence for my hypothesis that larger funds are associated with relatively stronger
persistence in good performance. Furthermore, as described in Section 3, I repeat all
these tests using an adjusted measure of size. In particular, for any given fund, I
alternatively measure size as the maximum initial net asset value across all funds in the
same management company or fund family. This measure specifically controls for the
fact that hedge funds may try to eliminate the effects of decreasing returns to scale by
'capping' their size at a certain optimal level, and starting up smaller spinoff funds
instead. The results using this new size measure, however, are very similar to those
generated by the original measure of size, and are thus not reported in the paper.
Therefore, my findings suggest that any effects of decreasing returns to scale are
dominated by the fact that higher hedge fund size is mainly reflective of superior
managerial skill24.
24 It is interesting to note here the trends in overall performance persistence displayed across the size and
age quintiles as well. Examining Table 5, one observes that funds in the bottom four size (age) quintiles
Finally, reverse trends in performance persistence are displayed across the
management fee and incentive fee groups in the two-period setting. One would expect
this, given that hedge funds that charge high (low) incentive fees typically compensate by
charging low (high) management fees at the same time. Specifically, one can see that
funds in the low management fee group exhibit the strongest persistence in overall, poor
and good performance, at the 5% level, relative to funds with high and moderate
management fees. On the other hand, one notes from Table 6 that, using appraisal ratios,
funds in the high incentive fee category exhibit significantly more persistence in good
(overall) performance at the 5 (10) % level compared to both low and moderate incentive
fee funds. Here, the generally positive25 relationship between incentive fees and
persistence in good performance is economically plausible. Indeed, this trend provides
evidence that more skilled managers generate persistently better performance, and these
managers may then set higher incentive fees in order to extract a higher surplus from
investors. An alternative interpretation is that higher performance fees are actually
required to attract more skilled managers. Either interpretation, however, supports the
argument that the level of observed incentive fees in hedge funds is likely to reflect
managerial skill and/or past performance.
In order to investigate the relationship between incentive fees and performance
persistence further, as well as provide additional evidence to support my initial
hypothesis that incentive fees are determined based on past performance, I devise a test to
examine the channel of managerial fee setting in greater depth. In particular, changes in
incentive fees for particular hedge funds over time are not directly observable, and it is
commonly assumed that fees are set exogenously by funds at the time of their inception26 .
However, I find significant evidence to suggest that, on average, managers of fund
companies increase incentive fees charged by new spinoff funds when at least one fund in
the family has performed persistently well so far2 7. This is consistent with anecdotal
display significantly greater persistence in overall performance relative to funds in the top size (age)
quintile at the 10 (5) % level. This indicates that the negative relationship between size (age) and
persistence in poor performance is stronger overall than the positive relationship between size (age) and
persistence in good performance.
25 The relationship is not strictly monotonic.
26 See Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2007).
27 In order to examine this, I take all the fund families listed in TASS with at least two or more funds that
were started after January 1996; there are 456 families in total. I then take each company in turn and rank
evidence from the hedge fund industry that managers of a particular fund may find it
contractually difficult to raise fees after realizing good performance, and therefore may
have to increase fees on a spinoff instead. Following on from this, I then investigate the
effects of incentive fees on persistence after controlling for this mechanism. My results
from this new procedure in the two-period framework, using non-parametric analysis, are
reported in Table 8. Here, I perform exactly the same tests as those described in Tables 4-
7, using returns net of incentive fees, but now set the incentive fee level of any particular
fund to be the lowest reported incentive fee across all funds within the same fund family
or management company. This specifically adjusts for the fact that any spinoff funds may
have had their fees increased in response to good past performance.
Examining the results in Table 8, one can see that the pattern of log cross-product
ratios across the incentive fee groups reported in Panel A is similar to that observed in
Table 4, for both performance measures. If, however, one examines the new results on
the significance of the differences between log cross-product ratios, reported in Panels B
and C of Table 8, one notes some changes. In particular, in Table 7, (using unadjusted
incentive fees), we observe that the high incentive fee group displays more, although not
significantly more, persistence in losers relative to the moderate and low fee groups. On
the other hand, in Panel C of Table 8, we now see that funds in the high incentive fee
group exhibit significantly less persistence in poor performance at the 1% (5%) level,
relative to funds in the low (moderate) incentive fee group. The results on persistence in
winners in Panel B of Table 8 show, however, that exactly as before, funds in the high
the funds within them by performance start date, (or the date on which they started reporting returns). For
each performance start date in ascending order, I examine, firstly, whether there is at least one existing fund
which has displayed significant persistence in good performance, (at the 5% level), up till that date. Here, I
measure persistence in good performance using the two-period CPR test of persistence in winners. This is
because I am not analyzing persistence of individual fund performance over the entire sample period.
Secondly, I look at whether any of the new funds started on that date have an incentive fee that is strictly
greater than the maximum incentive fee charged by all existing funds. For each fund family in the sample, I
then calculate the proportion of performance start dates, (excluding the minimum performance date), for
which we observe that both these criteria are met. This provides an approximate measure for each company
of the likelihood that, each time they set up one or more spinoff funds, they will increase incentive fees
charged by at least one of these new funds after there has been persistently good performance of at least
one existing fund. Finally, I compute the cross-sectional average of this likelihood measure and test
whether it is significantly greater than zero. Using appraisal ratios as the performance measure, I obtain a
mean of 0.0834 and a standard deviation of 0.2357. Given the sample size of 456, this produces a t-statistic
for the mean of 7.58, which is significantly greater than zero at the 5% level. Similarly, using alphas, I
obtain a mean of 0.0939, a standard deviation of 0.2524, and a statistically significant t statistic of 7.96.
incentive fee category display significantly more persistence in good performance
relative to funds in the low and moderate incentive fee groups.
Therefore, these findings indicate that there are actually two discernable effects
coming into play in the two-period framework, which influence the relationship between
incentive fees and persistence. Firstly, higher incentive fees are most likely associated
with greater persistence in good performance because they are reflective of superior
managerial skill, and we observe this relationship in the data. On the other hand, the
positive (but insignificant) relationship which is observed between incentive fees and
persistence in bad performance is most likely generated by the fact that hedge fund
managers increase fees in response to past good performance, (via spinoff funds), and
these managers include those that are unskilled but lucky. Thus, when I partially control
for this effect across all hedge funds, using data on fees for spinoffs, one observes a
reversal of the relationship between fees and persistence in poor (post-fee) performance,
but no impact on the relation between fees and persistence in good performance. Overall,
however, in the two-period setting, the positive relationship between incentive fees and
persistence in good performance is most significant, whereas the positive relationship
between incentive fees and persistence in poor performance is not. This indicates that the
effects of managerial fee setting through spinoff funds are limited in the short run
framework.
Having fully analyzed the trends revealed by non-parametric analysis of
persistence in my sample, I now turn to the results of the parametric tests, (displayed in
Tables 9 and 10). Here, I observe similarly strong evidence of persistence in alphas and
appraisal ratios. For example, there is evidence of persistence in performance which is
significant at the 1% level for the sample overall, using both performance measures.
Furthermore, examining the significance of the differences between the coefficients
across investment strategies in Table 10, one notes once again that the strongest evidence
of persistence in alphas and appraisal ratios is displayed by funds in the 'Convertible
Arbitrage' and 'Fixed Income' primary categories, as well as the similarly illiquid 'Event
Driven' category. In particular, all three of these strategies generate significantly higher
coefficients than six other primary categories at the 1% level, excluding each other.
Examining appraisal ratios, I also calculate that, on average, a one standard deviation
increase in appraisal ratio in a given month leads to a 21%, 14.5% and 30.8% increase in
appraisal ratio for the next month, for these three strategies respectively. Therefore, the
statistical and economic significance of these findings closely supports my results in the
non-parametric framework on the positive relationship between illiquidity exposure and
overall persistence. Moreover, we find once more that all strategies, with the exception of
the 'Managed Futures' category, display significant evidence of persistence overall at the
1% level using appraisal ratios, (5% level using alphas as the performance measure).
However, there are no significant trends displayed across the size, age, or
performance fee groups when conducting the parametric tests. Results are very similar
when testing positive persistence in above-average alphas, (persistence in good
performance), and below-average alphas, (persistence in bad performance) separately28.
One reason why the results obtained from parametric analysis are marginally weaker
overall than those generated by the non-parametric tests, could be that the latter approach
of dividing funds into just two groups, (winners and losers), each period is a slightly
coarser method of examining persistence in a two-period framework. Therefore, there is
probably a higher degree of spurious persistence generated by the contingency table tests.
As an alternative to the parametric tests described above, which employ the
Fama-Macbeth regression approach, I also conduct pooled time-series cross-sectional
OLS regressions of alphas (appraisal ratios) each month on alphas (appraisal ratios)
during the previous month, across funds with different strategies29. The results are
reported in Tables 11 and 12, with Newey-West standard errors, i.e. standard errors
corrected for serial correlation. Generally, the inferences drawn from these new tests are
similar to those drawn previously, (although results on persistence using appraisal ratios
are less significant than before). For example, using appraisal ratios and examining Table
28 These results are not reported in the paper. For the test of persistence in good performance, I run a
month-by-month cross-sectional regression of hedge fund alphas (appraisal ratios) on alphas (appraisal
ratios) during the previous month, conditional on alphas (appraisal ratios) in the previous month for any
given fund being positive and above the median alpha (appraisal ratio) for all funds in the same investment
strategy. The test of persistence in poor performance is defined analogously. I obtain similar results for
both these tests compared to the test of overall persistence; i.e. 'Convertible Arbitrage', 'Event Driven' and
'Fixed Income Arbitrage' display the most significant persistence in both good and bad performance, and
vice versa for the 'Managed Futures' strategy. No significant trends are observed across any of the
quintiles/groups for the characteristics, however.
29 Results are not reported across the quintiles/groups for the different characteristics, given the lack of
significant trends observed across the coefficients.
12, which reports t-statistics from tests of the significance of the differences between
coefficients across different investment strategies, one observes that the 'Convertible
Arbitrage' category exhibits the strongest relative persistence at the 1% level, followed
by the 'Event Driven' and 'Emerging Markets' strategies respectively. These results do
not exactly match those from the parametric tests reported in Tables 9 and 10. However,
given that the 'Convertible Arbitrage', 'Event Driven', and 'Emerging Markets'
strategies all fall within the group of most illiquid strategies as classified by Getmansky,
Lo and Makarov (2004), these findings do still provide significant evidence of a positive
association between illiquidity exposure and overall persistence in the two-period setting.
Importantly, these results hold even after controlling for illiquidity risk and serial
correlation in monthly returns, providing stronger evidence for a positive link between
illiquidity exposure and managerial skill.
In the next section, I extend my analysis to a multi-period framework and
examine whether these relationships continue to hold. In particular, it will be especially
powerful if I can show that several of the two-period results are also observed in the
multi-period setting. This is because the increased power of a multi-period test is likely to
diminish the significance of any kind of noise or spurious persistence observed in the
two-period framework. Furthermore, if there are certain fund characteristics which are
positively correlated with noise in the short run, (for example, one might expect smaller
or younger funds to generate more noise or volatility in their monthly returns), then the
test in the multi-period setting is a useful robustness check to confirm the validity of the
trends displayed in the two-period framework.
6. Multi-period Tests of Performance Persistence
Following the procedure of Agarwal and Naik (2000b), I now analyze persistence of
hedge fund performance in a multi-period framework. In order to do this, I use a 'two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smimov' (K-S) test to detect significant differences between the
observed distribution of two and more consecutive wins and losses for individual hedge
funds and the theoretical distribution of two and more consecutive wins and losses under
the assumption of no persistence30 . The results of the two-sample (two-sided) K-S test
based on alphas and appraisal ratios are reported in Table 13. In particular, I calculate K-
S test statistics and corresponding p-values from tests of persistence in wins and losses
across the various investment strategies and characteristic groups. Here, the K-S test
statistics measure the degree of persistence, or the maximum absolute difference between
the observed and theoretical cumulative distributions under the null, while the p-values
measure statistical significance. Therefore, I infer that persistence in, say, wins, is
significantly higher in one category than another, if the K-S test statistic for the former
category is higher, (indicating a higher degree of persistence), and also if its distribution
of wins is significantly different from the latter category's distribution of wins at the 5%
level, (indicating a significantly higher test statistic and degree of persistence). I do not
report here the results of my tests of the significance of the difference between
distributions of wins and losses across categories, but summarize the key findings in the
following paragraphs.
Examining Table 13, I find that there is significant evidence of overall multi-
period performance persistence at the 5% level, (examining the distribution of both wins
and losses, and using both alphas and appraisal ratios as my performance measure). This
result contrasts with that obtained by Agarwal and Naik (2000b), who find that the degree
of persistence in a multi-period framework is significantly lower than that displayed in a
two-period setting, for the earlier sample period of 1982-1998. Moreover, while Agarwal
and Naik (2000a and 2000b) find that persistence over several periods is driven much
more by repeat losers rather than by repeat winners, I obtain evidence of multi-period
persistence driven almost equally by consecutive winners and losers. However, I do also
observe that when I extend my analysis to the multi-period framework, there appears to
be slightly weaker evidence of clear-cut trends in performance persistence across hedge
fund characteristics and investment strategies. Nevertheless, I am still able to present
several results that are consistent with those generated by tests in the two-period
framework.
30 Under the null hypothesis of no persistence, the distribution of wins and losses for any given hedge fund
will be equivalent to a binomial distribution, with wins and losses being equally likely each period.
Firstly, looking across primary categories and using both performance measures, I
find that the 'Convertible Arbitrage' and 'Fixed Income Arbitrage' strategies display the
two highest K-S test statistics across all strategies, for tests of persistence in wins. These
strategies also display significant overall persistence at the 5% level. Furthermore, I find
that the distributions of consecutive wins for funds in 'Convertible Arbitrage' and 'Fixed
Income Arbitrage' are significantly different from the distributions of wins for all other
primary categories, (except for the 'Event Driven' strategy, and except for each other).
Therefore, these results suggest that, as in the two-period framework, 'Convertible
Arbitrage' and 'Fixed Income Arbitrage', which are two of the most illiquid strategies,
display the most significant degree of persistence in good performance in the long run.
The opposite result is true for 'Managed Futures', which is one of the very few strategies
to display consistently insignificant evidence of persistence, and falls into the group of
most liquid strategies classified by Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004).
In the multi-period framework, we can also now investigate further whether the
higher observed persistence in good performance of more illiquid strategies is generated
by superior managerial skill, or is merely a result of higher positive monthly serial
correlation. In particular, Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004) find that this illiquidity-
induced positive serial correlation is a short-term effect that disappears for horizons
greater than six months. Consequently, in order to control for this effect, I examine multi-
period persistence in wins over more than six consecutive periods, and compare the
results across the different investment strategies. Results are reported in Panel A of Table
14. Here I observe that the 'Convertible Arbitrage' and 'Fixed Income Arbitrage'
categories are two of only three strategies to display significant persistence in wins at the
5% level, and among those strategies, (which include the 'Event Driven' category), they
display the highest K-S test statistics. In addition, I find that the distribution of
consecutive wins for funds in the 'Convertible Arbitrage' strategy, followed by 'Fixed
Income Arbitrage', differs most significantly from all other primary categories at the 5%
level31 . Therefore, these results indicate that even after controlling for illiquidity risk and
the potential effect of higher short-term positive serial correlation in monthly returns, the
31 In other words, when comparing the significance of the difference in the distribution of wins across all
investment strategies, the highest number of primary categories differ significantly from the 'Convertible
Arbitrage' category, (followed by 'Fixed Income Arbitrage').
'Convertible Arbitrage' and 'Fixed Income Arbitrage' strategies still display the highest
degree of persistence in good performance in the long run. This suggests that the positive
relationship we observe in the multi-period framework between illiquidity and
persistence in wins is most likely driven by an underlying fundamental factor such as
skill.
Turning to the analysis of characteristics, one notes from Table 13 that funds
across all size and age quintiles display significant evidence of multi-period persistence at
the 5% level. One also observes that funds in the top size quintile display the highest p-
value and lowest test statistic for the test of persistence in losses, using both performance
measures. Furthermore, the distribution of consecutive losses for funds in the top size
quintile is found to be significantly different from the distribution of losses for funds in
each of the lower size quintiles. This indicates that the largest funds in the sample display
significantly less persistence in bad performance relative to smaller funds. Similarly, I
find that hedge funds in the bottom size (age) quintiles consistently generate significantly
lower (higher) K-S statistics for tests of persistence in wins (losses), relative to funds in
the top two size (age) quintiles. This suggests a significantly lower (higher) degree of
persistence in wins (losses) for funds in the bottom size (age) quintile, relative to the
largest (oldest) funds. Results are very similar using the adjusted measure of size
described in Sections 3 and 5. These observations are thus consistent with previous
results from contingency table analysis in the two-period framework.
A final notable trend that emerges from the multi-period analysis is associated,
once again, with the relationship between incentive fees and persistence. Examining
Table 13 and using appraisal ratios as the performance measure, one observes a positive
monotonic relationship between the level of incentive fees and the K-S statistics from
tests of persistence in both wins and losses. While the differences between these test
statistics are not significant at the 5% level, these results still suggest that the strongest
multi-period persistence, both in wins and losses, is exhibited by funds with the highest
incentive fees. This trend supports my initial hypothesis that fees are raised in response to
good past performance by both skilled, and unskilled but lucky funds.
I now analyze the relationship between incentive fees and performance
persistence more rigorously by performing the same multi-period tests as described
above, but using the adjusted measure of incentive fees described in Section 5. The
results from this analysis are reported in Panel B of Table 14. Here, I observe unchanged
trends across the fee groups for the test of persistence in wins. However, examining
persistence in losses across the incentive fee groups, I now find that the positive
monotonic relationship between K-S statistics and fees is reversed, using both
performance measures. In other words, the low fee category displays the largest test
statistic relative to the high and moderate fee groups, and thus exhibits the highest
persistence in losses. This constitutes a reversal of the positive relationship between fees
and persistence in poor performance that we observed earlier. As in the two-period
framework, these results thus reveal, once again, two channels that could affect the
relationship between incentive fees and persistence; skill and luck. Therefore, one
implication of my analysis is that my simple model of skill, luck, and endogenous
determination of fees sheds light on an important determinant of long run performance
persistence in the hedge fund industry.
7. Conclusion
The major result of this paper is that there exist hedge fund characteristics that are
associated with persistence in performance over time. This is most likely because these
characteristics are reflective, in various ways, of managerial skill and/or past
performance. The findings in this paper contrast sharply with ambiguous evidence of
performance persistence in the mutual fund industry.
Firstly, my analysis reveals that investment strategies with greater illiquidity
exposure display significantly more persistence in good, as well as overall performance,
even after controlling for short-term serial correlation and illiquidity risk. In particular,
this result supports my hypothesis that more skilled hedge fund managers choose trading
strategies in more complex and illiquid securities. The investment strategies that exhibit
the most significant persistence both in the short and long run frameworks, and thus
appear to send the strongest signal of skill, are the relatively illiquid 'Convertible
Arbitrage' category, followed by 'Fixed Income Arbitrage'. The opposite result holds for
the relatively more liquid 'Managed Futures' strategy.
Secondly, there is evidence from the non-parametric tests, in both the short and
long run settings, which indicates that the smallest (largest) hedge funds display the
strongest signs of persistence in bad (good) performance, even after controlling for the
effects of size-capping in response to decreasing returns to scale. The youngest (oldest)
funds also exhibit the most significant persistence in bad (good) performance. Therefore,
these results provide support for my initial hypotheses that higher age and size of hedge
funds are primarily reflective of superior managerial skill.
Finally, my analysis reveals that there is a positive relationship between incentive
fees and persistence in wins, generated by non-parametric tests in the two-period setting.
This finding suggests that higher incentive fees reflect higher managerial skill.
Furthermore, there is also evidence that high incentive fees generate the strongest
persistence in good as well as bad performance in the multi-period framework. This result
fits closely with the general predictions of the scenario that I develop in Section 3, where
incentive fees are raised in response to good past performance by both skilled and
unskilled, but lucky, fund managers. In particular, I find that, on average, management
companies have a significantly positive probability of increasing incentive fees for
spinoff funds after existing funds have realized persistently good performance. After I
partially control for this effect, using data on fees for spinoffs, the positive relationship
between incentive fees and persistence in poor performance reverses in the multi-period
setting. Thus, one can conclude that this mechanism of endogenously determining
incentive fees in the hedge fund industry is a potentially significant driver of long run
performance persistence.
One very useful extension to this paper would be investigate whether one could
develop a lucrative trading strategy by investing in (open-end) hedge funds which have
performed well in the past, and also possess characteristics, or follow strategies, which I
have shown to be associated with persistence in good performance. Consistent with the
results from all my tests, this would imply investing in the most illiquid funds, or
allocating capital to the funds that are the largest and oldest in addition to demonstrating
prior good performance. This is an avenue of research that has not been explored so far in
the literature, and thus could make an important contribution.
Other interesting extensions to the paper include examining more rigorously the
determination of incentive fees in the hedge fund industry, and also studying the
movement of individuals and managers across hedge funds, in order to provide further
evidence for the endogenous selection of certain investment strategies. For example,
given the findings in this paper, one would expect higher-ability workers and fund
managers to migrate towards funds that follow more illiquid strategies, since they could
better deploy their skills and might be able to demand higher compensation. Analyzing
the movement of individuals across hedge fund strategies would therefore provide a very
useful additional insight into the determinants of performance persistence in the hedge
fund industry.
Appendix: Definition of Primary Categories in TASS. 32:
Primary Category Definition Type of Strategy
Convertible Arbitrage
Long/Short Equity Hedge
Event Driven
Fund of Funds
Multi-Strategy
Global Macro
A strategy of arbitraging
the relative mispricing of
related convertible
securities (usually from
the same issuer) in order
to obtain low volatility
returns.
A strategy of investing in
equity or equity-like
instruments where net
exposure (long minus
short) is low.
A strategy that exploits
mispricings arising in
special situations or
events such as mergers,
restructurings, takeovers,
and so on.
Capital is allocated to a
variety of hedge funds
and pooled investment
vehicles which investors
might not have access to
otherwise.
Allocation of capital to a
mixture of strategies
simultaneously to realize
short and long-term
gains, and to capitalize
on current investment
opportunities
A strategy which uses
leverage and derivatives
to exploit
macroeconomic changes
in global economies
which affect securities,
commodities, interest
Non-directional
Non-directional
Non-directional
Cannot be
classified as a
directional or non-
directional
strategy.
Cannot be
classified as a
directional or non-
directional
strategy.
Directional
rates, exchange rates, and
so on.
32 Descriptions are obtained from Agarwal and Naik (2000b) and Caglayan and Edwards (2001).
Primary Category Definition Type of Strategy
Emerging Markets
Managed Futures
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Equity Market Neutral
Dedicated Short Bias
A strategy that focuses
on investing in volatile
emerging markets,
capitalizing on economic
changes.
An arbitrage strategy that
exploits relative
mispricings between
futures contracts and
replicating portfolios of
underlying securities.
A strategy of holding
long and short bond
positions in cash and
derivatives markets in
order to exploit pricing
discrepancies between
related securities.
A strategy that employs
both long and short
positions in equity
portfolios in order to
hedge out market risk.
A strategy similar to
long/short equity hedge,
except with significant
net short exposure.
Directional
Non-directional
Non-directional
Non-directional
Directional
TABLE 1
Sample Description
Number of funds in the TASS Hedge Fund Live and Graveyard databases. Funds have at least two years of
return history between January 1996 and March 2006, and the first 12 months of each fund's returns over
time are excluded from this analysis. Size and age quintiles are displayed in decreasing order from highest
to lowest, where 1 refers to the highest quintile, and 5 is the lowest. Size of a fund is measured as the fund's
initial Net Asset Value at the start of the selected period during which it reports monthly returns. Age is
defined as the number of monthly return observations reported by a fund since the date of the earliest return
observation across all funds within its fund family. Management fees are defined as an annual percentage
of the net assets managed by a fund, and the incentive fee is a percentage of a fund's annual net profits paid
to managers in reward for good performance. 'High' management fees are between 2% and 8%, 'Moderate'
management fees are between 1% and 2%, and 'Low' management fees are less than 1%. 'High' incentive
fees are between 20% and 50%, 'Moderate' incentive fees are between 2% and 20%, and 'Low' incentive
fees are less than 2%.
Number of Funds
Live Funds Dead Funds Combined
Primary Category
Convertible Arbitrage 85 77 162
Long/Short Equity Hedge 794 531 1325
Event Driven 289 127 416
Fund of Funds 673 283 956
Multi-Strategy 99 44 143
Global Macro 108 99 207
Emerging Markets 145 122 267
Managed Futures 154 210 364
Fixed Income Arbitrage 111 68 179
Equity Market Neutral 135 101 236
Dedicated Short Bias 18 14 32
Size (quintiles)
1 475 382 857
2 607 251 858
3 527 330 857
4 495 363 858
5 507 350 857
Age (quintiles)
1 642 211 853
2 593 269 862
3 481 372 853
4 493 363 856
5 402 461 863
Management Fee
Low 113 135 248
Moderate 1939 1089 3028
High 559 452 1011
Incentive Fee
Low 237 187 424
Moderate 528 287 815
High 1846 1202 3048
All Hedge Funds 2611 1676 4287
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics: Investment Strategies
Panel A reports the number of funds within each of the 11 investment strategies classified by TASS, in
each of the five size and age quintiles. Size and age quintiles are displayed in decreasing order from
highest to lowest, where 1 refers to the highest quintile, and 5 is the lowest.
Panel B reports the number of funds within each of the 11 investment strategies, in each of the three
management fee and incentive fee groups.
PANEL A
Size Age
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Primary
Category
Convertible 32 59 23 35 13 39 35 29 21 38
Arbitrage
Long/Short 341 208 209 333 234 244 214 300 293 274
Equity Hedge
Event Driven 96 123 87 68 42 91 78 82 88 77
Fund of Funds 99 165 235 191 266 241 230 169 186 130
Multi-Strategy 36 37 20 30 20 34 23 21 26 39
Global Macro 37 44 55 34 37 24 52 36 31 64
Emerging 49 25 41 56 96 42 62 71 46 46
Markets
Managed 107 66 79 39 73 97 79 50 69 69
Futures
Fixed Income 32 62 37 28 20 19 38 45 32 45
EquityMairket 24 63 60 40 49 17 41 47 62 69
Neutral
Dedicated 4 6 11 4 7 11 10 3 2 6
Short Bias
PANEL B
IncFee M.Fee
High Mod. Low High Mod. Low
Primary
Category
Convertible 141 13 8 26 128 8
Arbitrage
Long/Short 1181 104 40 122 1145 58
Equity Hedge
Event Driven 376 18 22 73 320 23
Fund of Funds 170 513 273 218 668 70
Multi-Strategy 133 6 4 52 86 5
GlobalMacro 166 24 17 90 102 15
Emerging 198 48 21 79 174 14
Markets
Managed 285 65 14 272 66 26
Futures
Fixed Income 162 11 6 31 131 17
Equity Market 218 9 9 44 183 9
Neutral
Dedicated Short 28 4 0 5 25 2
Bias
TABLE 3
Cross-sectional Summary Statistics: Investment Strategies
Panel A reports the cross-sectional mean, median and standard deviation of size and age within each of the
11 investment strategies classified by the TASS database. Panel B reports corresponding cross-sectional
mean, median and standard deviation of time-series averages of alphas and appraisal ratios across all funds
in each of the investment strategies.
PANEL A
Size Age
(millions (months)
Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev
Primary
Category
Convertible 1017 1128 1288 95 90 269
Arbitrage
Long/Short Equity 1310 991 6008 89 76 280
Hedge
Event Driven 1778 1118 8539 97 86 303
Fund of Funds 914 803 2043 103 96 297
Multi-Strategy 1132 1105 1926 91 77 281
Global Macro 1591 1026 5777 85 76 286
Emerging Markets 2279 1340 14339 90 83 239
Managed Futures 1724 1077 4825 108 92 381
Fixed Income 6490 1107 42969 82 82 224
Equity Market 987 1044 1793 76 65 242
Neutral
Dedicated Short 855 878 864 113 112 322
Bias
All Funds 1554 1026 10664 94 82 294
PANEL B
Alpha Appraisal
(per ratio (per
month) month)
Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev
Primary
Category
Convertible -0.1068 -0.0685 0.5660 -0.1051 -0.0614 0.5672
Arbitrage
Long/Short -0.1505 -0.0932 1.1159 -0.0800 -0.0284 0.3592
Equity Hedge
Event Driven -0.0307 -0.0451 0.8960 -0.1663 -0.0447 0.9858
Fund of Funds -0.0929 -0.0412 0.7214 -0.0719 -0.0320 0.4624
Multi-Strategy -0.0733 -0.2373 1.1989 -0.8419 -0.1474 5.9151
Global Macro -0.2317 -0.0463 1.3269 -0.0805 -0.0096 0.4056
Emerging -0.3650 -0.2766 1.8331 -0.1922 -0.0895 0.6165
Markets
Managed -0.3532 -0.1033 1.7748 -0.2495 -0.0317 2.5318
Futures
Fixed Income -0.0629 0.0196 0.5771 0.0163 0.0113 0.3930
Equity Market -0.0940 -0.0664 0.7422 -0.2061 -0.0363 2.1515
Neutral
Dedicated Short -0.0131 -0.1807 0.8255 0.0053 -0.0378 0.2278
Bias
All Funds -0.1485 -0.0674 1.1210 -0.1365 -0.0350 1.4844
TABLE 4
Winner and Loser Two-Way Contingency Test: Log Cross-Product Ratios
This table reports the logarithm of cross-product ratios from winner and loser two-way contingency table
analysis. The 'Overall' CPR (cross-product ratio) is defined as (WW*LL)/ (WL*LW). The cross-product
ratios for 'Winners' and 'Losers' are analogously defined as (WW)/(WL) and (LL)/(LW) respectively. Z
tests are then used to examine whether the logarithm of each CPR is significantly greater than zero.
*** indicates significance of the given log cross-product ratio at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at
the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 1% level.
Log CPR: Log CPR: Log CPR:
Overall Winners Losers
Alphas Appraisal
ratios
1.0357* 1.0239*
0.2992* 0.3162*
0.7484* 0.7626*
0.4673* 0.4608*
0.5706* 0.5333*
0.3156* 0.3174*
0.4966* 0.5408*
0.0201 -0.0053
1.0811* 1.0546*
0.3906* 0.3424*
0.3166* 0.3138*
0.3856* 0.3857*
0.5004* 0.5051*
0.4420* 0.4313*
0.4641* 0.4619*
0.4147* 0.4298*
0.3900* 0.3881*
0.4189* 0.4398*
0.5097* 0.4944*
0.5034* 0.4998*
0.4591* 0.4520*
0.4558* 0.4554*
0.4676* 0.4714*
0.3401* 0.3384*
0.3965* 0.4102*
0.4502* 0.4546*
0.4526* 0.4532*
0.4417" 0.4430*
Alphas Appraisal
ratios
0.4920* 0.4958*
0.1435* 0.1541*
0.3601* 0.3726*
0.2275* 0.2270*
02547* 0.2422*
0.1385* 0.1438*
0.2390* 0.2613*
-0.0017 -0.0125
0.5239* 0.5135*
0.1714* 0.1564*
0.1099** 0.1228*
0.2205* 0.2277*
0.2715* 0.2742*
0.1563* 0.1498*
0.2352* 0.2344*
0.1261* 0.1442*
0.1959* 0.2044*
0.2275* 0.2450*
0.2401* 0.2303*
0.2015* 0.1950*
0.1416* 0.1329*
0.2027* 0.2121*
0.2286* 0.2331*
0.1869* 0.1850*
0.1824* 0.1874*
0.2165* 0.2215*
0.2216* 0.2250*
0.2092* 0.2134*
Alphas Appraisal ratios
0.5437* 0.5281"
0.1557* 0.1622*
0.3884* 0.3901*
0.2398* 0.2337*
0.3159* 0.2911*
0.1771* 0.1736*
0.2577* 0.2796*
0.0218 0.0072
0.5572* 0.5411*
0.2191* 0.1860*
0.2067* 0.1910*
0.1651* 0.1580*
0.2288* 0.2310*
0.2858* 0.2815*
0.2288* 0.2275*
0.2887* 0.2855*
0.1941* 0.1837*
0.1913* 0.1948*
0.2696* 0.2641*
0.3020* 0.3048*
0.3176* 0.3192*
0.2530* 0.2432*
0.2391" 0.2383*
0.1533* 0.1533*
0.2141* 0.2228*
0.2338* 0.2331*
0.2310* 0.2282*
0.2324* 0.2296*
Primary Category
Conv. Arbitrage
L/S Equity Hedge
Event Driven
Fund of Funds
Multi-Strategy
Global Macro
Emerging Markets
Managed Futures
Fixed Inc. Arbitrage
Eq.Market Neutral
Dedicated Short Bias
Size (quintile)
1
2
3
4
5
Age (quintile)
1
2
3
4
5
Management Fee
Low
Moderate
High
Incentive Fee
Low
Moderate
High
All Hedge Funds
TABLE 5
Winner and Loser Two Way Contingency Test: Comparison of Overall Log Cross-Product Ratios
This table reports results from the test of the significance of the difference between overall log cross-
product ratios of funds in different primary categories/quintiles/groups, using appraisal ratios as the
performance measure. (Results using alphas as the performance measure are not reported here, given that
they are very similar). Investment categories, size and age quintiles, and management and incentive fee
groups are displayed along the columns. The figure reported in row i and column j is then the Z-statistic
from the test of the significance of the following difference: the overall log cross-product ratio of funds in
the category/quintile/group corresponding to column i, minus the overall log cross-product ratio of funds in
the category/quintile/group corresponding to column j. A (one-sided) Z-statistic of 1.282, 1.645 and 1.96
corresponds to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. Bold print and *** indicates
significance at the 10% level, bold print and ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and bold print alone
indicates significance at the 1% level.
Cony. L/S Event Fund of Multi- Global Emerg. Manag. Fixed Equity Ded.
Arb Equity Driven Funds Strategy Macro Mkts Futures Inc. Market Short
Hedge Arb. Neutral Bias
0 14.96 4.97 11.64 7.56 11.59 8.70 19.28 -0.48 11.34 7.20
-14.96 0 -14.13 -6.04 -4.40 -0.03 -6.20 9.78 -15.48 -0.61 0.03
-4.97 14.13 0 9.10 4.21 8.94 5.17 19.13 -5.51 8.63 4.88
-11.64 6.04 -9.10 0 -1.4*** 3.17 -2.13 13.54 -12.18 2.68 1.64
-7.56 4.40 -4.21 1.44* "  0 3.45 -0.13 9.75 -8.00 3.09 2.20
-11.59 0.03 -8.94 -3.17 -3.45 0 -4.23 6.38 -12.03 -0.43 0.04
-8.70 6.20 -5.17 2.13 0.13 4.23 0 12.44 -9.20 3.83 2.42
-19.28 -9.78 -19.14 -13.54 -9.75 -6.38 -12.44 0 -19.72 -7.01 -3.45
0.48 15.48 5.51 12.18 8.00 12.03 9.20 19.72 0 11.79 7.50
-11.34 0.61 -8.63 -2.68 -3.09 0.43 -3.83 7.01 -11.78 0 0.30
-7.20 -0.03 -4.87 -1.6 "** -2.20 -0.04 -2.42 3.45 -7.50 -0.30 0
Size (quintile)
1 2 3 4 5
0 -4.6440 -1.6414*** -3.0406 -1.6292***
4.6440 0 2.5287 1.6275*** 2.6480
1.6414*** -2.5287 0 -1.0677 0.0518
3.0406 -1.6275*** 1.0677 0 1.1524
1.6292*** -2.6480 -0.0518 -1.1524 0
Age (quintile)
1 2 3 4 5
0 -2.3121 -4.2811 -4.0099 -1.8558**
2.3121 0 -2.1217 -2.0919 -0.3487
4.2811 2.2127 0 -0.1736 1.1537
4.0099 2.0919 0.1736 0 1.2284
1.8558** 0.3487 -1.1537 -1.2284 0
Management Fee
Low Moderate High
0 6.5505 5.3207
-6.5505 0 -1.0358
-5.3207 1.0358 0
Incentive Fee
Low Moderate High
0 0.1044 -1.5446***
-0.1044 0 -1.6153***
1.5446** 1.6153*** 0
TABLE 6
Winner and Loser Two Way Contingency Test: Comparison of Winner Log Cross-Product Ratios
This table reports results from the test of the significance of the difference between winner log cross-
product ratios of funds in different categories/quintiles/groups, using appraisal ratios as the performance
measure. A (one-sided) Z-statistic of 1.282, 1.645 and 1.96 corresponds to significance at the 10%, 5% and
1 % levels respectively. Bold print and *** indicates significance at the 10% level, bold print and **
indicates significance at the 5% level, and bold print alone indicates significance at the 1% level.
Conv. L/S Event Fund of Multi- Global Emerg. Manag. Fixed Equity Ded.
Arb Equity Driven Funds Strategy Macro Mkts Futures Inc. Market Short
Hedge Arb. Neutral Bias
0 10.22 3.31 7.86 5.52 8.16 5.98 13.47 -0.39 7.99 5.32
-10.22 0 -9.78 -4.31 -2.52 0.33 -1.18 7.17 -10.65 -0.08 0.49
-3.31 9.78 0 6.21 3.38 6.50 3.67 13.58 -3.76 6.28 3.81
-7.86 4.31 -6.21 0 -0.43 2.60 -1.3"** 9.85 -8.30 2.26 1.6*"
-5.52 2.52 -3.38 0.43 0 2.22 -0.47 6.51 -5.88 1.96" 1.7*"
-8.16 -0.33 -6.50 -2.60 -2.22 0 -3.14 4.36 -8.52 -0.31 0.30
-5.98 4.18 -3.67 1.29**" 0.47 3.14 0 8.82 -6.38 2.86 2.08
-13.47 -7.17 -13.58 -9.85 -6.51 -4.36 -8.82 0 -13.83 -4.82 -2.06
0.39 10.65 3.76 8.30 5.88 8.52 6.38 13.83 0 8.35 5.56
-7.99 0.08 -6.28 -2.26 -1.96" 0.31 -2.86 4.82 -8.35 0 0.49
-5.32 -0.49 -3.81 -1.6*** -1.69*" -0.30 -2.08 2.06 -5.56 -0.49 0
Size (quintile)
1 2 3 4 5
0 -2.5796 3.9466 -0.3823 4.3436
2.5796 0 6.0018 2.1268 6.4242
-3.9466 -6.0018 0 -4.1572 0.2562
0.3823 -2.1268 4.1572 0 4.5437
-4.3436 -6.4242 -0.2562 -4.5437 0
Age (quintile)
1 2 3 4 5
0 -2.5827 -1.4732*** 0.4761 2.9034
2.5827 0 0.8108 2.4617 4.4721
1.4732*** 0.8108 0 1.6207*** 3.7082
-0.4761 -2.4617 -1.6207*** 0 2.2346
-2.9034 -4.4721 -3.7082 -2.2346 0
Management Fee
Low Moderate High
0 3.3647 1.7513"*
-3.3647 0 -1.9099**
-1.7513** 1.9099"* 0
Incentive Fee
Low Moderate High
0 -0.3567 -1.9103**
0.3567 0 -1.7516**
1.9103** 1.7516** 0
TABLE 7
Winner and Loser Two Way Contingency Test: Comparison of Loser Log Cross-Product Ratios
This table reports results from the test of the significance of the difference between loser log cross-product
ratios of funds in different categories/quintiles/groups, using appraisal ratios as the performance measure. A
(one-sided) Z-statistic of 1.282, 1.645 and 1.96 corresponds to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % levels
respectively. Bold print and *** indicates significance at the 10% level, bold print and ** indicates
significance at the 5% level, and bold print alone indicates significance at the 1% level.
Cony. L/S Event Fund of Multi- Global Emerg. Manag. Fixed Equity Ded.
Arb Equity Driven Funds Strategy Macro Mkts Futures Inc. Market Short
Hedge Arb. Neutral Bias
0 10.94 3.71 8.60 5.17 8.23 6.33 13.79 -0.29 8.05 4.86
-10.94 0 -10.20 -4.23 -3.70 -0.37 -4.58 6.66 -11.24 -0.78 -0.46
-3.71 10.20 0 6.66 2.57 6.15 3.64 13.48 -4.04 5.93 3.08
-8.60 4.23 -6.66 0 -1.6"** 1.88** -1.72** 9.30 -8.92 1.5"** 0.68
-5.17 3.7 -2.57 1.61*** 0 2.66 0.29 7.28 -5.43 2.41 1.4*
-8.23 0.37 -6.15 -1.88"* -2.66 0 -2.84 4.65 -8.49 -0.30 -0.25
-6.33 4.58 -3.64 1.72** -0.29 2.84 0 8.77 -6.63 2.55 1.3**
-13.79 -6.66 -13.49 -9.30 -7.28 -4.65 -8.77 0 -14.06 -5.10 -2.83
0.29 11.24 4.04 8.92 5.43 8.49 6.63 14,06 0 8.32 5.04
-8.05 0.78 -5.93 -1.5"*** -2.41 0.31 -2.55 5.10 -8.32 0 -0.07
-4.86 0.46 -3.08 -0.68 -1.4*** 0.25 -1.3"** 2.83 -5.04 0.07 0
Size (quintile)
1 2 3 4 5
0 -2.9760 -6.3108 -3.8952 -6.7045
3.9760 0 -2.4593 0.1857 -2.7235
6.3108 2.4593 0 2.6906 -0.1891
3.8952 -0.1857 -2.6906 0 -2.9692
6.7045 2.7235 0.1891 2.9692 0
Age (quintile)
1 2 3 4 5
0 -0.6972 -4.5813 -6.1774 -5.6256
0.6972 0 -3.8020 -5.4410 -5.0596
4.5813 3.8020 0 -1.8844** -2.1410
6.1774 5.4410 1.8844*"" 0 -0.5309
5.6256 5.0596 2.1410 0.5309 0
Management Fee
Low Moderate High
0 5.8865 5.7586
-5.8865 0 0.4458
-5.7586 -0.4458 0
Incentive Fee
Low Moderate High
0 0.5031 -0.2711
-0.5031 0 -0.5303
0.2711 0.5303 0
TABLE 8
Winner and Loser Two-Way Contingency Test: Adjusted Incentive Fees
Panel A reports the logarithm of cross-product ratios from winner and loser two-way contingency table
analysis across incentive fee groups. Incentive fees for any particular fund are now defined as the minimum
incentive fee level across all funds in the same fund family. *** indicates significance at the 10% level, **
indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 1% level.
Panel B reports results from the test of the significance of the difference between winner log cross-product
ratios of funds in different incentive fee groups, using appraisal ratios as the performance measure. As
before, the figure reported in row i and column j is the Z-statistic from the test of the significance of the
difference between the winner log cross-product ratios of funds in the fee groups corresponding to columns
i and j. Panel C reports analogous results from the test of the significance of the difference between loser
log cross-product ratios of funds. Bold print and *** indicates significance at the 10% level, bold print and
** indicates significance at the 5% level, and bold print alone indicates significance at the 1% level.
PANEL A
Log CPR: Log CPR: Log CPR:
Overall Winners Losers
Alphas Appraisal Alphas Appraisal Alphas Appraisal
ratios ratios ratios
Incentive Fee
Low 0.4221* 0.4292* 0.1671* 0.1714* 0.2550* 0.2578*
Moderate 0.4500* 0.4526* 0.2192* 0.2239* 0.2308* 0.2287*
High 0.4521* 0.4551* 0.2995* 0.2342* 0.2226* 0.2208*
PANEL B
Low Moderate High
0 -0.9997 -3.8421
0.9997 0 -3.2867
3.8421 3.2867 0
PANEL C
Low Moderate High
0 0.7547 2.2848
-0.7547 0 1.8457**
-2.2848 -1.8457** 0
TABLE 9
Parametric Tests
This table reports averages of estimated slope coefficients for month-by-month cross-section regressions of
alphas (appraisal ratios) in each month on alphas (appraisal ratios) in the previous month. (All cross-
sectional regressions are run with an intercept). T-tests are performed on the time-series averages of these
coefficients, and the t-statistics for regressions in each category/quintile/group below are in parentheses.
*** indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and * indicates
significance at the 1% level, for a one-sided test.
Primary Category
Convertible Arbitrage
Long/Short Eq. Hedge
Event Driven
Fund of Funds
Multi-Strategy
Global Macro
Emerging Markets
Managed Futures
Fixed Income Arbitrage
Equity Market Neutral
Dedicated Short Bias
Size (quintile)
1
2
3
4
5
Age (quintile)
1
2
3
4
5
Management Fee
Low
Moderate
High
Incentive Fee
Low
Moderate
High
All Hedge Funds
One-month alphas on one-month
alphas
0.2958* (6.7235)
0.0903* (3.3901)
0.2093* (4.7825)
0.1531* (5.0270)
0.1762* (3.9102)
0.1124* (4.0325)
0.1408* (4.4172)
0.0256 (0.8147)
0.2548* (6.9356)
0.0650* (2.0607)
0.1053** (1.8344)
0.0946* (3.6075)
0.1142* (4.3238)
0.0917* (3.4615)
0.1338* (5.5065)
0.1151* (4.7681)
0.0943* (3.9866)
0.0993* (3.8126)
0.1333* (5.0941)
0.1249* (4.2519)
0.0887* (2.8752)
0.0945* (3.8518)
0.1191* (5.5029)
0.0727* (2.8390)
0.1283* (4.6612)
0.1090* (4.9507)
0.1033* (4.7320)
0.1072* (4.9922)
One-month appraisal ratios on one-
month appraisal ratios
0.3708* (9.0064)
0.1375* (4.4550)
0.3126* (7.0974)
0.1777* (5.5258)
0.2668* (3.1603)
0.0807* (2.8204)
0.2760* (5.2748)
0.0651 (0.6870)
0.3677* (12.516)
0.1488* (4.4143)
0.1425* (2.4517)
0.1496* (5.4324)
0.1951* (6.9240)
0.2170* (5.1372)
0.1884* (6.8169)
0.2723* (2.3209)
0.2066* (3.0911)
0.1975* (5.9264)
0.1944* (5.7676)
0.1782* (6.2344)
0.1927* (6.3202)
0.2073* (6.5452)
0.2021* (6.9208)
0.1997* (2.4872)
0.1618* (5.0083)
0.2444* (4.4748)
0.2505* (4.3101)
0.2265* (4.7583)
TABLE 10
Parametric Tests: Comparison of Coefficients
This table reports results from the test of the significance of the difference between coefficients reported by
funds in different primary categories, from the parametric tests in Table 9, using appraisal ratios as the
performance measure. (Results using alphas as the performance measure are not reported here, given that
they are very similar). Investment strategies are displayed along the columns. (Results for age, size and
performance fee groups are not reported here given these are generally not significant at the 10% level).
The figure reported in row i and column j is then the t-statistic from the test of the significance of the
following difference: the coefficient generated by funds in the primary category corresponding to column i,
minus the coefficient for the primary category corresponding to column j. A (one-sided) t-statistic of 1.282,
1.645 and 1.96 corresponds to significance at the 10%, 5% and 1 % levels respectively. Bold print and ***
indicates significance at the 10% level, bold print and ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and bold
print alone indicates significance at the 1% level.
Conv. L/S Event Fund of Multi- Global Emerg. Manag. Fixed Equity Ded.
Arb Equity Driven Funds Strategy Macro Mkts Futures Inc. Market Short
Hedge Arb. Neutral Bias
0 4.53 0.97 3.70 1.11 5.79 1.4""*** 2.96 0.06 4.17 3.20
-4.53 0 -3.26 -0.90 -1.4"** 1.3"*" -2.28 0.73 -5.40 -0.25 -0.08
-0.97 3.26 0 2.47 0.48 4.42 0.54 2.37 -1.04 2.95 2.33
-3.70 0.90 -2.47 0 -0.99 2.25 -1.6"** 1.13 -4.36 0.62 0.53
-1.11 1.4"** -0.48 0.99 0 2.09 -0.09 1.6"** -1.13 1.3**1 1.21
-5.79 -1.3"** -4.42 -2.25 -2.09 0 -3.28 0.16 -7.00 -1.5"** -0.95
-1.4""** 2.28 -0.54 1.6"** -0.09 3.28 0 1.95"* -1.5"** 2.04 1.7"*
-2.96 -0.73 -2.37 -1.13 -1.6"** -0.16 -1.95"** 0 -3.05 -0.83 -0.70
-0.06 5.40 1.04 4.36 1.13 7.01 1.5""** 3.05 0 4.89 3.46
-4.17 0.25 -2.95 -0.62 -1.3"** 1.5"** -2.05 0.83 -4.89 0 -0.09
-3.20 0.08 -2.33 -0.53 -1.21 0.95 -1.7"* 0.70 -3.46 -0.09 0
TABLE 11
Parametric Tests: Pooled OLS Regressions for Investment Strategies
This table reports estimated slope coefficients for pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of
alphas (appraisal ratios) in each month on alphas (appraisal ratios) in the previous month. (All cross-
sectional regressions are run with an intercept). T-tests are performed after correcting standard errors for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, and the t-statistics for regressions in each primary category below
are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level,
and * indicates significance at the 1% level, for a one-sided test.
One-month alphas on one-month One-month appraisal ratios on one-
alphas month appraisal ratios
Primary Category
Convertible Arbitrage 0.2506* (5.8562) 0.3755* (12.575)
Long/Short Eq. Hedge 0.0708* (5.4064) 0.1079* (14216)
Event Driven 0.0734* (5.0560) 0.2705* (5.5732)
Fund of Funds 0.0883* (5.3052) 0.1718* (18.043)
Multi-Strategy 0.0910* (5.6968) 0.2586* (5.0135)
Global Macro 0.0888* (5.8989) 0.0170 (0.3288)
Emerging Markets 0.1006* (6.5834) 0.2471* (8.7558)
Managed Futures 0.0636* (3.7860) -02630 (-0.9840)
Fixed Income Arbitrage 0.0667* (3.5562) -0.2290 (-0.8770)
Equity Market Neutral 0.0621* (3.2732) -0.2550 (-0.9360)
Dedicated Short Bias 0.0634 ** (1.8344) -0.2500 (-0.9300)
All Hedge Funds 0.0893* (9.8465) 0.1711* (4.7096)
TABLE 12
Parametric Tests: Comparison of Coefficients for Pooled OLS Regressions
This table reports t-statistics from the test of the significance of the difference between coefficients reported
by funds in different primary categories, from the pooled OLS regression tests in Table 11, using appraisal
ratios as the performance measure. Bold print and *** indicates significance at the 10% level, bold print
and ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and bold print alone indicates significance at the 1% level.
Conv. L/S Event Fund of Multi- Global Emerg. Manag. Fixed Equity Ded.
Arb Equity Driven Funds Strategy Macro Mkts Futures Inc. Market Short
Hedge Arb. Neutral Bias
0 8.69 1.84** 6.50 1.96 5.99 3.13 2.38 2.30 2.30 2.31
-8.69 0 -3.31 -5.25 -2.89 1.7** -4.76 1.39*** 1.3*** 1.33*** 1.3**
-1.8** 3.31 0 2.00 0.17 3.57 0.42 1.96 1.88** 1.9""* 1.9**
-6.50 5.25 -2.00 0 -1.7*" 2.94 -2.53 1.63*** 1.53** 1.57*** 1.6**
-1.96 2.89 -0.17 1.65** 0 3.30 0.20 1.92** 1.83** 1.86** 1.9"*
-5.99 -1.7** -3.57 -2.94 -3.30 0 -3.90 1.03 0.92 0.98 0.98
-3.13 4.76 -0.42 2.53 -0.20 3.90 0 1.9** 1.81** 1.84** 1.8**
-2.38 -1.4*** -1.96 -1.6*"" -1.92** -1.03 -1.9** 0 -0.09 -0.02 -0.03
-2.30 -1.3*** -1.88** -1.5"""** -1.83** -0.92 -1.81** 0.09 0 0.07 0.06
-2.30 -1.3*** -1.90** -1.6*** -1.85**"" -0.98 -1.84** 0.02 -0.07 0 -0.01
-2.31 -1.3*** -1.91** -1.6*** -1.86** -0.98 -1.84** 0.03 -0.06 0.01 0
TABLE 13
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Multi-period Performance Persistence
This table reports K-S test statistics and p-values from the two-sided Kolmogorov-Smimov test based on
alphas and appraisal ratios. * indicates significance at the 5% level; (i.e. the actual distribution of two and
more consecutive wins/losses is significantly different from the theoretical distribution at the 5% level,
indicating multi-period performance persistence).
Alphas Appraisal Ratios
Wins Losses Wins Losses
K-S P-value
0.1620* 0
0.0710* 0
0
0
0.0125
0.7119
0.0009
0.6474
0
0.0004
0.0715 0.5060
Primary
Category
Conv. Arb
Long/Short
Equity Hedge
Event Driven
Fund of Funds
Multi-Strategy
Global Macro
Emerg. Mkts
M.Futures
Fixed Inc. Arb
Equity Market
Neutral
Ded. Sh. Bias
Size(quintile)
1
2
3
4
5
Age (quintile)
1
2
3
4
5
Man. Fee
Low
Moderate
High
Inc. Fee
Low
Moderate
High
All Funds
K-S P-value
0.1649* 0
0.0453* 0
0.1128*
0.0665*
0.1042*
0.0381
0.0856*
0.0068
0.1274*
0.0681*
0
0
0.0001
0.3532
0
1
0
0.0057
0.0614 0.6868
0.0306*
0.0782*
0.0732*
0.0675*
0.0805*
0.0518*
0.0619*
0.0710*
0.0862*
0.0905*
0.0501*
0.0697*
0.0501*
0.0565*
0.0649*
0.0728*
0.0033
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.00014
0
0
K-S P-value
0.1971* 0
0.0564* 0
0.0965*
0.0701*
0.0599
0.0508
0.0680*
0.0119
0.1658*
0.0610*
0
0
0.0808
0.0910
0.0003
0.9958
0
0.0196
0.0900 0.2385
0.0717*
0.0942*
0.0474*
0.0850*
0.0546*
0.0661*
0.0703*
0.0667*
0.0748*
0.0530*
0.0460
0.0767*
0.0612*
0.0572*
0.0643*
0.0731*
0
0
0.000187
0
0.000003
0
0
0
0
0.0058
0.0583
0
0
0.0001194
0
0
K-S P-value
0.1963* 0
0.0541* 0
0.1150*
0.0660*
0.1297*
0.0240
0.0829*
0.0071
0.1323*
0.0443
0.0880
0.0270*
0.0830*
0.0746*
0.0666*
0.0836*
0.0571*
0.0673*
0.0726*
0.0812*
0.0752*
0.1012*
0.0678*
0.0463*
0.0596*
0.0623*
0.0773*
0
0
0
0.8800
0
1
0
0.1646
0.2201
0.0133
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0699* 0 0.0690* 0 0.0680* 0 0.0630* 0
0.1145*
0.0665*
0.0751*
0.0284
0.0636*
0.0214
0.1697*
0.0834*
0
0
0.00001
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0011
0.0314
0
0
0
0
0
0.0680*
0.0745*
0.0534*
0.0835*
0.0546*
0.0618*
0.0695*
0.0744*
0.0838*
0.0600*
0.0503*
0.0767*
0.0573*
0.0738*
0.0709*
0.0740*
0.0630* 00.0699* 0 0.0690* 0 0.0680* 0
TABLE 14
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for Multi-period Performance Persistence: Controlling for Short-term
Serial Correlation and Adjusting Incentive Fees
Panel A reports results across investment strategies for the test of the difference between the observed
distribution of 6 and more consecutive wins or losses, and the theoretical distribution of 6 and more
consecutive wins or losses under the null of no persistence. * indicates significance at the 5% level.
Panel B reports results of the original K-S test, where incentive fees for a particular fund are now defined
as the minimum incentive fee level charged across all funds in the same fund family. * indicates
significance at the 5% level.
PANEL A
Alphas Appraisal Ratios
Wins Losses Wins Losses
K-S P-value K-S P-value K-S P-value K-S P-value
Primary
Category
Conv. Arb 0.3451* 0.0057 0.2186 0.1379 0.3315* 0.0256 0.2186 0.1912
L/S Eq. Hedge 0.0964 0.0755 0.1482* 0.0011 0.0734 0.3224 0.1980* 0
Event Driven 0.2285* 0.0006 0.3405* 0 0.2392* 0.0006 0.3581* 0
Fund of Funds 0.1112 0.0992 0.2207* 0 0.1068 0.1310 0.1186* 0.0467
Multi-Strategy 0.1353 0.8841 0.1857 0.5443 0.2154 0.4962 0.2684 0.1282
Global Macro 0.0861 0.9944 0.1720 0.3828 0.1740 0.5493 0.1349 0.7171
Emerg. Mkts 0.1211 0.5702 0.0924 0.8978 0.1239 0.5506 0.1606 0.1660
Manag.Futures 0.0421 1 0.0767 0.9874 0.2210 0.0688 0.0667 0.9920
Fixed Inc. Arb 0.2779* 0.0234 0.3230* 0.0040 0.2759* 0.0473 0.3925* 0.0027
Equity Neutral 0.1425 0.5231 0.1756 0.2753 0.1305 0.7414 0.1734 0.3306
Ded.Short Bias 0.3000 0.6490 0.2000 0.9748 0.3016 0.7899 0.4167 0.4710
PANEL B
Alphas Appraisal Ratios
Wins Losses Wins Losses
K-S P-value K-S P-value K-S P-value K-S P-value
Incentive Fee
Low 0.0616* 0 0.0838* 0 0.0604* 0 0.0746* 0
Moderate 0.0610* 0 0.0662* 0 0.0628* 0 0.0660* 0
High 0.0743* 0 0.0624* 0 0.0751* 0 0.0637* 0
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Abstract
This paper proposes and tests a simple explanation for momentum profits: systematic
outperformance arises because certain stocks have persistently strong fundamentals
which are not fully valued by the market. We find that "winner" portfolios have higher
book-to-market ratios than "loser" portfolios, and the economic and statistical
significance of momentum profits is markedly reduced when calculated above value
benchmarks. Profits to a momentum strategy also disappear when removing firms with
high (low) value from the winner (loser) portfolios. A large component of the returns to
relative strength portfolios may thus stem from such portfolios overweighting high value
stocks. Our results suggest a close relation between the value and momentum anomalies.
1 Pavitra Kumar is from the Sloan School of Management, MIT, 50 Memorial Drive, E52-458, Cambridge,
MA 02142-1347, pavitra.kumar@gmail.com. This paper is based on joint work with Alex Edmans, from
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Jun Qian, Roberto Rigobon and
participants of the MIT Finance Lunch for helpful comments and discussion. All errors are my own.
1. Introduction
The momentum anomaly, first documented by Jegadeesh (1990), Lehmann (1990) and
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), remains one of the most puzzling phenomena to financial
economists. It appears to violate the weakest form of financial market efficiency, since it
suggests that investors can obtain excess returns by trading on past price information.
While many anomalies disappear soon after they are published, momentum has continued
to be prevalent many years after its initial discovery (Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)).
Moreover, whereas excess returns to small and value stocks may be at least partly
attributable to their higher risk (see, e.g., Fama and French (1995), Vassalou and Xing
(2004)), it is less obvious that past winners should be riskier than the average stock.
Researchers have proposed a number of existing explanations for momentum.
Behavioral theories include conservatism in expectations updating, (Barberis, Shleifer
and Vishny (1998)), biased self attribution (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam
(1998)) and selective information conditioning (Hong and Stein (1999)). Rational
explanations argue that the high returns of winner portfolios are expected by investors as
compensation for risk. Conrad and Kaul (1998) and Berk, Green and Naik (1999) argue
that stocks with high realized returns, selected by a momentum strategy, are those with
high unconditional expected returns.2 Johnson (2002) shows that momentum can arise
from episodic shocks to dividend growth rates, and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) point
to business cycle explanations.
This paper investigates an alternative, quite simple explanation for momentum.
Certain stocks persistently outperform (underperform) because they are intrinsically of
higher (lower) quality, in a way that is not immediately valued by the market. Put
differently, high returns in a particular period result from the firm possessing attractive
characteristics, and systematic undervaluation of these persistent characteristics also
causes the firm to outperform in future periods.
2 However, Grundy and Martin (2001) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) provide evidence contradicting
this explanation.
3 Lesmond, Schill and Zhuo (2004) argue that momentum profits may not exist in the first place, as the
strategy requires frequent trading in securities with high transaction costs. Korajczyk and Sadka (2005)
disagree.
We hypothesize that strong fundamentals may be one such characteristic. This is
motivated by the findings of Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny
(1994) and others, that firms with high fundamentals-to-price ratios typically outperform
the market. Lakonishok et al., La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and
Daniel and Titman (1997, 2006) provide evidence that this outperformance is due to the
market systematically undervaluing the benefits of strong fundamentals, rather than the
higher returns reflecting rational compensation for risk. Strong fundamentals can cause
firms to systematically outperform, and thus exhibit upward momentum.
We commence by showing that momentum profits are somewhat weaker over
1999-2006, a later period than that examined by earlier studies. However, momentum
profits are still strongly significant over the overall 1962-2006 period. For example, the
monthly return to a strategy that sorts stocks into deciles based on their prior six-month
return and holds them for the following six months is 0.93%, significant at the 1% level.
The key result of the paper is to demonstrate that momentum profits become insignificant
when calculated over stocks with similar book-to-market ratios. Returns to the 6m/6m
are now halved to 0.48%. While this number is borderline significant, the returns for
momentum strategies formed on different sorting and holding periods become
statistically insignificant, in addition to their economically important fall in magnitude.
While prior researchers have used different stock filters when constructing their
momentum portfolios, our use of value benchmarks attenuates momentum profits
regardless of the filters used. Similar attenuation occurs when calculating raw returns
and removing high (low) value firms from the winner (loser) portfolio.
In sum, a sizable component of momentum profits appears to stem from the book-
to-market characteristics of the long, (or winner) and short, (or loser) portfolios. Hence
the source of value profits may also be a significant source of momentum returns. The
implications for whether the momentum anomaly is behavioral or rational depends on
one's beliefs on the source of excess returns to value stocks. The hypothesis that
motivated this paper was that high book-to-market stocks have inherently strong
fundamentals which are persistently undervalued by the market; in short, certain stocks
systematically perform better (exhibit positive momentum) simply because they are
better. This view is consistent with the previously cited evidence that returns to a value
strategy stem from mispricing. Under this interpretation, momentum does not represent
fair compensation for risk (as proposed by rational explanations) but is a behavioral
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phenomenon. However, the underlying behavioral bias is ignorance of a firm's
fundamentals, which is subtly different from delayed reaction to one-off items of news,
as theorized by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999).
An alternative view is that superior returns to value stocks stem from their greater
risk (e.g. Fama and French (1995)). Thus, subtracting returns to value benchmarks
removes the risk of a momentum portfolio, in turn suggesting that the high unadjusted
returns to a relative strength portfolio also stem from compensation for risk. Regardless
of whether excess returns to value stocks are rational or behavioral, our results point to a
close interaction between the value and momentum anomalies, thus implying that a
convincing explanation for value profits will also account for a large portion of
momentum returns. However, we find that value profits are unaffected by subtracting
returns to a momentum benchmark, suggesting that the retums to a value strategy stem
from a difference source to momentum profits.
Closest to our paper is a study by Asness (1997). He also considers both value
and momentum, but seeks to see whether the momentum strategy is most profitable
among high or low value stocks (and vice-versa), rather than whether a component of
momentum profits stems from their value characteristics. He therefore does not construct
benchmark-adjusted returns. Our explanation of momentum is similar in spirit to Chordia
and Subrahmanyam (2006), who find that a significant component of momentum can be
explained by earnings momentum.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 examines the time trend in the
profitability of momentum strategies, including the recent period of 1999-2006 which is
not covered by existing studies. Section 3 demonstrates that momentum profits across all
time horizons are significantly reduced when calculated in excess of value benchmarks.
Section 4 concludes.
2. Momentum Profits, 1962-2006
This section replicates and extends earlier findings on the profitability of momentum
strategies for the sample period 1962-2006. Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) original study
found significant profits to a momentum strategy over 1962-1989. Their subsequent 2001
paper found that profits continued to be strong in 1990-1998. In addition to being an
"out-of-sample" verification of their original findings, this result was particularly striking
as most financial market anomalies disappear (or are significantly attenuated) soon after
initial publication.
We start by examining whether momentum has continued to be profitable in the
more recent 1999-2006 period. We largely follow the methodology of Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993, 2001) to construct the momentum portfolios. We obtain return data from
CRSP for all stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock
Exchange (AMEX) or Nasdaq. If a stock delists at any point during the sample period,
we use the delisting return as the final return of the stock.4 Since the analysis in Section
3 requires calculation of book-to-market ratios, we exclude all stocks for which this ratio
cannot be calculated. (The details of this calculation are in Section 3).
We first construct 3, 6, 9 and 12-month lagged returns for all stocks in the sample.
If, for any month t and for any particular stock, any one of the (monthly) returns during
the past J months is missing, then the J-month lagged return is also reported as missing at
time t for that stock. For month t, stocks are then classified into the winner portfolio if
their J-month lagged return is within the top decile of J-month lagged returns for all
stocks at time t, and also if their market price is at least $1 for month t-1. The loser
portfolio for month t is analogously defined. Both winner and loser portfolios are equal-
weighted.
While Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) do not use any kind of filters in constructing
winner and loser portfolios, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) exclude stocks priced below
$5, and all stocks with a market capitalization in the smallest NYSE decile. This is to
ensure that their results are not driven by small or illiquid stocks, or by bid-ask bounce,
but they state that these filters have little overall effect. Our baseline analysis uses a $1
price filter and no market capitalization filter, as this is a middle ground between
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). However, we also report
our results under these two alternative methodologies.
To increase the power of our tests, we construct overlapping portfolios. For J in
{3,6,9,12}, K in {3,6,9,12}, and for each month t, we construct a momentum portfolio by
buying the winner portfolio and shorting the loser portfolio for month t, based on
performance over the past J months. This portfolio is then held for K months. Therefore,
4 This latter procedure is not followed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001), but is followed in most other
asset pricing papers. Eliminating this step makes little difference to our results.
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in each month there will be K sub-portfolios: the portfolio newly constructed in the
current month, plus the K-1 portfolios formed in the previous K-1 months. All are equally
weighted to give the return for the momentum portfolio in month t, for the (J,K) strategy.
For each value of J and K, we then calculate average returns to the momentum portfolio
over time.
Table 1 illustrates the results under our baseline strategy of a $1 price filter. Panel
A shows that momentum profits over all horizons for the period 1999-2006 are
significantly less than in the earlier periods studied by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993,
2001). Profits are not statistically significant at any horizon; indeed, in more than half of
the (JK) combinations, momentum profits are negative. It is not surprising that
momentum profits have substantially declined since Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), given
the substantial attention that the strategy has received by both academics and
practitioners.
Despite the poor recent performance of the momentum strategy, profits remain
highly significant over the entire 1962-2006 period. For example, the 6m/6m strategy
earned an average of 0.93% per month, significant at less than the 1% level, and
commensurate with the 1.17% monthly return reported by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001)
for 1962-98.
Table 2 illustrates the time-trend in momentum profits for the 6m/6m strategy
under different methodologies. To achieve an approximately equal split of the sample
period, we divide the sample into 1962-1989 (studied by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993))
and 1990-2006. The "JT 2001" strategy excludes stocks priced below $5 and stocks in
the bottom decile by market capitalization. "JT 1993" employs no filters, but excludes
Nasdaq stocks. "Baseline" includes Nasdaq stocks and uses a $1 price filter, and "HLS
2000" is the methodology of Hong, Lim and Stein (2000). They sort firms into terciles
rather than deciles, to ensure that momentum profits are not purely driven by firms at the
extremes. The top (bottom) tercile consists of firms in the top (bottom) three deciles
according to past returns, and the middle tercile contains the middle four deciles. They
employ no filters and include Nasdaq stocks.
As the table illustrates, momentum profits are highly significant for 1962-1989
across all strategies. As expected, the Hong et al. (2000) methodology produces the
lowest profits, owing to the coarser sort. The profitability of all strategies declines for
1990-2006, with only JT 2001 producing statistically significant returns. For the entire
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1962-2006 period, the profits from HLS 2000 are significant at the 10% level, and all
strategies involving decile sorts produce returns significant at the 5% level or better.
3. Value and Momentum
Our hypothesis is that a significant part of momentum profits stems from the differential
fundamentals of winners and losers. We therefore calculate the book-to-market (B/M)
ratio of each stock, using the methodology of Fama and French (1992) and Daniel and
Titman (2006).5 In each month, we calculate the average B/M ratio of all stocks in the
winner portfolio. We then average this statistic across all months to obtain an average
B/M ratio for a typical "winner" stock. We repeat the process for stocks in the loser
portfolio, and conduct the analysis for all Jin {3,6,9,12}.
Table 3 illustrates the results. For all values of J, there is a marked difference in
the average B/M ratio of the winner and loser portfolios, in the region of 0.3-0.46. Given
that B/M is a significant determinant of cross-sectional returns (Fama and French (1992),
Lakonishok et al. (1994)), it may indeed be the case that different B/M ratios at least
partly explain the differential returns on winner and loser portfolios.
To test this, we employ the characteristics-matching method of Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman and Wermers (1997). In each month, we independently sort stocks into ten groups
based on their B/M ratio. Each stock in the winner and loser portfolio is then matched
with an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks in the same B/M decile, at the same point in
time. We calculate abnormal returns for the winner and loser portfolios over and above
their value benchmarks.
The results are shown in Table 4 for the baseline method, over the 1962-2006
period. For all values of (JK), momentum profits are markedly reduced. Out of the 16
5 Market value is at the end of the previous calendar year, calculated from CRSP. To calculate book value,
we first calculate shareholders' equity. This is Stockholders' Equity (Compustat item 216) if it is not
missing. If it is missing, we use Total Common Equity (item 60) plus Preferred Stock Par Value (item 130)
if both of these are present. Otherwise, we use Total Assets (item 6) minus Total Liabilities (item 130) if
both are present. Else, book-to-market is coded as missing and the observation removed from the sample.
To obtain book value, we subtract from shareholders' equity the preferred stock par value, where we use
redemption value (item 56), liquidating value (item 10), or carrying value (item 130), in that order, as
available. If all are missing, we treat book-to-market as missing. Finally, if not missing, we add balance
sheet deferred taxes (item 35) and subtract the FASB106 adjustment (item 330). All book values are
recalculated each July and held constant through the following June.
6 The deciles of average B/M ratio across the whole sample of stocks are, in ascending order, 0.33, 0.49,
0.62, 0.73, 0.82, 0.93, 1.00, 1.05, 1.17 and 11.30.
(J,K) combinations, value-adjusted returns are negative for four combinations, and only
significantly positive at the 5% level for three (6m/6m, 6m/9m and 9m/6m). These
horizons featured highly significant raw momentum profits, and so it is not surprising that
returns remain statistically significant after value adjustment. Even so, subtracting value
benchmarks has an economically significant effect, reducing returns by approximately
one half.
Table 5 conducts the same analysis for the 6m/6m strategy across the four
different methodologies. (For HLS 2000, stocks are matched according to their value
tercile). Over the entire 1962-2006 period, using value benchmarks renders momentum
profits insignificant for both the JT 1993 and HLS 2000 methods. While profits remain
significant for the other two methods, the monthly return falls by an economically
significant 50 basis points. Value-adjusted returns for 1990-2006 are not significant under
any methodology, and are insignificant for HLS 2000 even for the 1962-1989 period.
An alternative way to investigate whether momentum profits are driven by winner
(loser) portfolios containing high (low) value stocks is to investigate the effect of
removing such stocks from the portfolios. This analysis is conducted in Table 6. Panel A
illustrates momentum returns under the baseline methodology, (results are similar for
other methodologies), when removing stocks in the top (bottom) B/M decile from the
winner (loser) portfolios. This has a similar effect to subtracting benchmark returns, with
monthly returns dropping markedly, and becoming statistically insignificant in most
cases. Panel B shows that removing stocks in the top (bottom) B/M tercile from the
winner (loser) portfolios leads to returns being insignificant for all values of (J,K).
Finally, we ask the reverse question: can higher returns to value stocks be
explained by their momentum characteristics? In Table 7, Panel A, we calculate the raw
returns to stocks in each B/M decile, and replicate previous findings on the significant
premium earned by value stocks. Panel B calculates returns over and above momentum
benchmarks, and finds that the returns to a value strategy are actually marginally
enhanced by benchmark adjustment. Therefore, there is no evidence that any portion of
the superior returns to a value portfolio stems from this portfolio overweighting past
winners.
4. Conclusion
This paper investigates a simple explanation for momentum that does not require biased
reactions to new information or time-varying risks. Instead, it proposes that certain firms
persistently outperform the market because they have stronger intrinsic fundamentals.
Simply put, certain firms consistently do well because they are better. We investigate the
contribution to momentum profits of one characteristic previously linked to significant
stock outperformance: value. We find that momentum profits are markedly reduced when
calculated in excess of value benchmarks, regardless of the methodology used to
formulate the momentum strategy. Indeed, in many cases, momentum profits lose their
statistical significance. Similarly, a momentum strategy loses profitability when
removing high (low) value firms from the winner (loser) portfolios. Both analyses
suggest that the bulk of momentum profits stem from the strategy containing long (short)
positions in firms with strong (weak) fundamentals. However, excess returns to value
stocks cannot be explained by their momentum characteristics.
Although subtracting returns on value benchmarks has an economically
meaningful effect on momentum profits, they remain positive in many cases and
statistically significant in a few. While it is interesting that such a simple adjustment can
explain a meaningful portion of momentum returns, it is not surprising that it cannot
entirely explain away such a prominent and long-standing anomaly. The existing
explanations proposed in previous research may explain why some momentum still
prevails after adjusting for value. Moreover, the source of value returns, (in particular,
whether they stem from mispricing or represent just compensation for risk), is itself under
considerable debate. This paper's evidence suggests that the value and momentum
anomalies may have a common source.
Table 1
Returns of Relative Strength (Momentum) Portfolios, Baseline Methodology
The relative strength portfolios are formed based on J and K for the different strategies as indicated in
the first column and row, respectively. All available stocks in the CRSP database, (for which yearly
data on book-to-market ratio is available), are ranked in ascending order on the basis of J month
lagged returns. An equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) past return decile with
prices exceeding $1 is the winner (loser) portfolio. The relative strength or "momentum" portfolio
takes a long (short) position in the winner (loser) portfolio for K months. The average returns to this
strategy are presented in this table, with t-statistics in parentheses. Panel A presents results for the
sample period of January 1999 to December 2006. Panel B presents results for the sample period of
January 1962 to December 2006.
PANEL A: 1999-2006
J K= 3 6 9 12
3 Winner - Loser 0.0002 0.0056 0.0021 -0.0020
(0.0162) (0.5920) (0.2389) (-0.2960)
6 Winner - Loser 0.0063 0.0052 -0.0012 -0.0020
(0.4886) (0.4365) (-0.1188) (-0.2389)
9 Winner - Loser 0.0001 -0.0034 -0.0044 -0.0097
(0.0056) (-0.2962) (-0.4496) (-1.1454)
12 Winner - Loser -0.0108 -0.0061 -0.0126 -0.0128
(-0.8809) (-0.5698) (-1.3223) (-1.4487)
PANEL B: 1962-2006
J K= 3 6 9 12
3 Winner - Loser 0.0022 0.0059 0.0061 0.0059
(0.8414) (2.6751) (3.0299) (3.5308)
6 Winner - Loser 0.0071 0.0093 0.0089 0.0064
(2.3212) (3.3906) (3.7519) (2.9764)
9 Winner - Loser 0.0082 0.0098 0.0074 0.0041
(2.5813) (3.5447) (2.9057) (1.7557)
12 Winner - Loser 0.0078 0.0072 0.0043 0.0013
(2.5533) (2.5508) (1.6250) (0.5320)
Table 2
Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios, Different Methodologies
This table reports the average monthly returns of the relative strength portfolios, for the J=6, K=6
strategy, across various sample periods and methodologies. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
"Baseline" strategy is the methodology described in Table 1. "JT 1993" employs no filters and
excludes Nasdaq stocks. "JT 2001" includes Nasdaq stocks, but excludes stocks with a price below $5
and a market capitalization in the lowest NYSE size decile. In "HLS 2000", the winner (loser)
portfolio is an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) past return tercile. This
methodology employs no filters and includes Nasdaq stocks.
1962-1989 1990-2006 1962-2006
Baseline 0.0105 0.0063 0.0093
(3.6622) (1.0973) (3.3906)
JT 1993 0.0083 0.0017 0.0062
(2.9665) (0.3682) (2.5520)
JT 2001 0.0137 0.0153 0.0147
(5.2830) (2.7301) (5.6518)
HLS 2000 0.0041 0.0018 0.0032
(2.1787) (0.4538) (1.7612)
Table 3
Average Book-to-Market Ratios of Relative Strength Portfolios, Baseline Methodology
All available stocks in the CRSP database, (for which yearly data on book-to-market ratio is
available), are ranked in ascending order on the basis of J month lagged returns and an equally
weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) past return decile is the winner (loser) portfolio.
Stocks are only included in the winner and loser portfolios at each point in time if they have a price
greater than or equal to $1 at the beginning of the holding period. The column entitled "B/M" presents
average values of the book-to-market ratio, over all months in the sample period, for the winner and
loser portfolios, for all values ofJ. The sample period is January 1962 to December 2006.
J=3 6 9 12
Winner 2.0778 1.9578 1.8465 1.7266
Loser 1.7916 1.6268 1.4934 1.3011
Table 4
Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios in excess of Book-to-Market Ratio Benchmarks,
Baseline Methodology
All available stocks in the CRSP database are ranked in ascending order on the basis of J month
lagged returns, and an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) past return decile
with prices exceeding $1 is the winner (loser) portfolio. Stocks are then independently sorted each
month based on the value of their book-to-market ratio, and each stock within the winner and loser
portfolio at every point in time is matched with an equal weighted portfolio of stocks in the same
book-to-market ratio decile. This table reports the average monthly returns of the relative strength
portfolios over and above the book-to-market ratio benchmarks, with t-statistics in parentheses. The
sample period is January 1962 to December 2006.
J K= 3 6 9 12
3 Winner - Loser -0.0021 0.0019 0.0019 0.0018
(-0.950) (0.9852) (1.0719) (1.2581)
6 Winner - Loser 0.0025 0.0048 0.0043 0.0018
(0.9447) (2.0141) (2.1684) (0.9958)
9 Winner - Loser 0.0037 0.0053 0.0028 -0.0005
(1.3201) (2.2573) (1.3213) (-0.2386)
12 Winner - Loser 0.0025 0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0038
(0.9632) (0.8329) (-0.4061) (-1.8412)
Table 5
Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios, Different Methodologies, in excess of Book-
to-Market Ratio Benchmarks
This table presents average monthly returns of the relative strength portfolios in excess of book-to-
market ratio benchmarks, across various sample periods and methodologies, for the J=6, K=6 strategy.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
1962-1989 1990-2006 1962-2006
Baseline 0.0069 0.0005 0.0048
(2.9652) (0.1040) (2.2573)
JT 2001 0.0095 0.0091 0.0098
(4.0303) (1.8051) (4.1343)
JT 1993 0.0053 -0.0005 0.0034
(2.4306) (-0.1247) (1.6892)
HLS 2000 0.0019 -0.0014 0.0006
(1.2288) (-0.4023) (0.3930)
Table 6
Returns of Relative Strength Portfolios excluding High and Low Book-to-Market Ratio
Stocks, Baseline Methodology
All available stocks in the CRSP database are ranked in ascending order on the basis of J month
lagged returns and an equally weighted portfolio of stocks in the highest (lowest) past return decile
with prices exceeding $1 is the winner (loser) portfolio. Stocks are then independently sorted each
month based on the value of their book-to-market ratio. Panel A presents the average monthly returns
of the relative strength portfolios when all stocks with book-to-market ratio in the top (bottom) decile
are excluded from the winner (loser) portfolio. Panel B presents the analogous results when all stocks
with book-to-market ratio in the top (bottom) tercile are excluded from the winner (loser) portfolio. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. The sample period is January 1962 to December 2006.
Panel A
J K =  3 6 9 12
3 Winner - Loser -0.0006 0.0036 0.0038 0.0038
(-0.2129) (1.541) (1.8341) (2.199)
6 Winner - Loser 0.0046 0.0068 0.0068 0.0043
(1.4389) (2.41) (2.7846) (1.9257)
9 Winner - Loser 0.0059 0.0078 0.0055 0.0023
(1.7648) (2.7069) (2.115) (0.9496)
12 Winner - Loser 0.006 0.0055 0.0028 -0.0002
(1.8873) (1.9088) (1.036) (-0.0842)
Panel B
J K= 3 6 9 12
3 Winner - Loser -0.0045 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0007
(-1.5826) (-0.0691) (0.2228) (0.3884)
6 Winner - Loser 0.0003 0.003 0.0033 0.0012
(0.0815) (1.0329) (1.2895) (0.501)
9 Winner - Loser 0.0017 0.0038 0.0022 -0.0005
(0.501) (1.2641) (0.8038) (-0.2049)
12 Winner - Loser 0.0015 0.0017 -0.0004 -0.003
(0.4413) (0.557) (-0.1507) (-1.1107)
Table 7
Returns of Book-to-Market Ratio-Sorted Portfolios.
Panel A below presents average monthly returns of equal8-weighted portfolios of firms sorted into
book-to-market ratio deciles. The ten portfolios of stocks are labeled below such that BM1 represents
the portfolio with the lowest book-to-market ratio, and BM10O represents the portfolio with the highest
book-to-market ratio. Average monthly returns are also reported for the strategy that buys portfolio
BM10O and shorts portfolio BM1. This portfolio is labeled BM10 - BM1 below. t-statistics are reported
in parentheses. The sample period is January 1962 to December 2006.
Panel B presents the average monthly returns of all portfolios over and above equal-weighted
momentum benchmarks, (using 6-month lagged returns).
PANEL A PANEL B
BM1 0.0098 BM1 -0.0044
BM2 0.0093 BM2 -0.0037
BM3 0.0101 BM3 -0.0026
BM4 0.0118 BM4 -0.0009
BM5 0.0127 BM5 0.0002
BM6 0.0139 BM6 0.0014
BM7 0.0148 BM7 0.0021
BM8 0.0163 BM8 0.0034
BM9 0.0185 BM9 0.0051
BM10 0.0197 BM10O 0.0063
BM10 - BM1 0.0099 BM10 - BM1 0.0106
(5.4506) (6.9097)
8 Using value-weighted portfolios produces similar results.
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Abstract
This paper develops a measure of international financial contagion using a semi-structural
approach. In particular, we work with a multi-country dynamic equilibrium setting, placing a
constraint on the portfolio volatility of one of the countries. The tightening of this constraint
is a channel through which shocks are propagated internationally in our model. We then
derive a measure of the tightness of the constraint using cross-equation restrictions from the
model, rather than performing a full structural estimation. This measure is demonstrated
to be a common factor that affects the covariance of all countries across the world at the
same time, and thus constitutes our contagion estimator. We finally evaluate our measure of
international contagion with regards to its predictability on asset price co-movement across
the world, as well as on news about the recent sub-prime crisis. The major result of the
paper is that we find evidence that our global contagion estimator is a strong measure of the
sub-prime crisis in this regard.
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1. Introduction
Since the first quarter of 2007 the US equity markets have been hit with a sequence of shocks
related to the sub-prime crisis. Despite the fact that prior to this crisis, developed colmtries
seemed to have decoupled from one another, meaning that correlations of output, conslunp-
tion, inflation, interest rates, and stock market returns had dropped significantly from the
prior decade, the events after the summer of 2007 made it very clear that contagion was
back, and with a vengeance. Measuring the degree of contagion has never been an easy task
in applied work, however, and determining the relative importance of the different theories of
contagion has been even more daunting. The main reason for this is that contagion is usually
estimated using reduced form representations, which complicate the interpretation of coeffi-
cients as well as the separation between different theories of propagation. For example, from
the computation of simple correlations to linear models, from copulas to GARCH models,
from principal components to probit regressions, all are agnostic about the different theories
of contagion'. Furthermore, in most cases, different theories of why shocks are transmitted
internationally are tested in a regression based framework, by introducing interaction terms
as a regressor on the right hand side. Although this approach has taught us a great deal
about the crises in the 1990s, it has had its limitations with regards to analyzing the strength
of international linkages which generate contagion.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we develop an estimation method for in-
ternational contagion that is semi-structural. As opposed to the standard methods in the
literature, our estimation of the strength of global transmission mechanisms for shocks is
based on cross-equation restrictions that arise from a formal model of financial constraints.
We do not fit the model entirely, (which would constitute a fully fledged structural estima-
tion), but rather use the restrictions derived from the model. We view this as the next (and
necessary) step in the empirical contagion literature, disentangling the different channels of
propagation before fitting a full structural model.
1For principal component studies, see e.g., Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2007).
For evidence of contagion based on reduced-form linear latent factor models, see e.g., Corsetti, Pericoli, and
Sbracia (2005), Dungey, Fry, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, and Martin (2005), and Rigobon (2003), and for a copula
approach see e.g., Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2004) and Rodriguez (2007).
Secondly, we study the sub-prime collapse which originated in the US. Clearly there has
been dramatic contagion across the world caused by the eruption of this crisis, and this
has been exacerbated by the tightening of global financial constraints. In order to relate our
measure of financial contagion to the actual contagion generated by the sub-prime meltdown,
we evaluate our contagion measure with regards to its predictability on news and asset price
co-movement in almost 50 stock markets in the world, around the time of the crisis.
For the first purpose of our study, the estimation of contagion, Sections 2 and 3 of the
paper develop a dynamic equilibrimn model of asset prices, in which contagion is transmitted
via the (daily) tightening of portfolio volatility constraints2 . We assume that volatility
constraints are placed on the portfolio of a representative financial institution in the base
or 'Center' country, as in the model of Pavlova and Rigobon (2007). The reasoning behind
this choice of constraint is that restrictions on volatility are very similar in spirit to limits on
Value-at-Risk (VAR), which form an extremely important part of risk regulation for banks
across the globe. In particular, the definition of VAR is the worst expected loss of a portfolio
over a given horizon at a particular confidence level. Therefore, a constraint on VAR is
equivalent to a limit on the downside risk of a portfolio, whereas a constraint on volatility
simply restricts overall risk. The similarity between these two types of constraint is thus very
clear; however, it is far more tractable to model restrictions on portfolio volatility rather than
VAR.
The presence of these realistic financial constraints can then be directly tied to the conta-
gious effects of crises such as the sub-prime collapse3 . Indeed, the contagion measure which
we derive from our model of volatility restrictions is demonstrated to be a common factor
that affects the covariance of all countries across the world at the same time; this is explained
2Related literature on two-good two-country asset pricing models includes Helpman and Razin (1978),
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Zapatero (1995), which do not feature portfolio constraints. Related work on
portfolio constraints in the asset pricing literature includes, for example, Basak and Croitorn (2000), Basak
and Cuoco (1998), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Detemple and Serrat (2003), Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2004)
and Shapiro (2002). Also see Cass, Siconolfi, and Villanacci (2001) for analysis of a general equilibrium model
with portfolio constraints. For more applied analyses, see Boyer, Kumagai, and Yuan (2006), Geanakoplos
(2003), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Mendoza and Smith (2002), and Yuan (2005).
3There are several papers in the empirical literature which argue that financial risk-regulation has indeed
been largely responsible for contagion in developing and emerging markets over the last twenty years or so.
For example, see Calvo (2002), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003).
in greater detail in Section 4, which evaluates some of the implications of our model in the
data. Therefore, our paper provides evidence which links actual international contagion to
an increase in the tightening of financial constraints facing banks across the globe.
For the second purpose of our paper, namely our empirical analysis in Section 4, we collect
information on the stock market indices of 49 countries, and their respective exchange rates
relative to the US, (which we take as our 'Center' or constrained country; this makes sense
given that the US was the country of origin of the sub-prime crisis). It is important to
highlight that with the information we have,(at daily frequencies), we cannot fit the whole
model. The reason is that we do not have enough moments in the data to pin down all the
parameters. This is why we adopt a semi-structural approach.
Our model has two very important implications that distinguish our approach from the
standard one used in the literature. Firstly, when there is a shock that tightens the constraint
imposed on the Center comuntry, the co-movement of all stock markets in the world is affected.
In other words, a tightening of the constraint not only affects the co-movement between the
Center country and any other country, but it also affects the co-movement between any two
other countries in the world. The second implication from our model is that if all stock
markets are measured in the same currency, then this change in the co-movement of any two
stock markets has to be identical in magnitude across all possible pairs of colmtries in the
world. This means that contagion cannot be measured in our model simply by looking at
the increase in the correlation across countries after a shock to the constraint. Rather, it
has to be the case that, as a result of a tightening of the constraint in the Center country,
covariances across all countries increase by the exact same amount, and only this proportion
of their co-movement can be associated with global financial contagion in our set-up.
Another main difference between our approach and the standard methodology in the
literature is that we have to include as many countries as possible in our analysis. Contagion
papers rarely do this; indeed, most of the time they analyze a subset of countries across the
world. In our case, however, because of the implications of the model, contagion can only
be measured from the co-movement implied by the joint shift in covariances of all countries.
Our approach is not exempt from criticism, given that our model has to make several
simplifying asslmptions that are unlikely to be true in reality. Firstly, it assumes that
consumers' utility has a log representation. Secondly, it assulmes that markets are complete.
Thirdly, we have an endowment economy without labor and capital, and our supply shocks
are assumed to be independent across countries. Fourthly, our model is a real model where
the demand shocks are represented by consumer expenditure shifts; therefore, it does not
include nominal, monetary, fiscal, and other sources of shocks. As a result, it is clear that
we are deriving our cross-equation restrictions from a very stylized setting.
Moreover, our empirical implementation requires us to extend the assumptions in our
model even further. For example, we not only have to assume that supply shocks are
independent across countries, but we also have to assume that their heteroscedasticity is
independent across countries as well, (see Section 4). In other words, we are not only
assuming independence of first moments, but for the estimation procedure we also need
to assume independence of second moments. Furthermore, we end up implementing our
contagion measure using a rolling window to estimate the variance-covariance matrix of all
countries in the world. If daily options data on bundles of stock market indices and individual
stock markets existed, we could at least estimate the implied variances of countries from
financial markets at a daily frequency. Unfortunately, this information does not exist and
we are left with having to use a rolling window to estimate variances and covariances, (and,
in turn, our contagion measure), instead.
Despite the presence of several of these simplifying assumptions, the major result from
our empirical analysis is that our measure of contagion has strong predictability effects on
the daily number of news articles in world newspapers documenting the sub-prime crisis.
There is also a high daily positive correlation between changes in our contagion estimator
and changes in the co-movement of stock prices across the globe, following the sub-prime
collapse. Therefore, our new contagion measure appears to be a strong measure of the crisis
in this regard.
2. The Model
Our first objective in this paper is to model how a realistic example of a constraint on global
financial institutions, (a restriction on volatility), affects the international co-movement of
asset prices. Extending the model of Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), we initially work with
a three country model, where all three countries are assumned to be identical in size. (The
justification for this will be provided later on; in particular, we find that in both constrained
and unconstrained environments, all three countries always hold an identical munumber of
shares in the stocks of each country.) In this section and the next, we then specialize the
model of Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) to consider a specific constraint on the volatility of
the portfolio of one of the countries. We examine the implications of this constraint for the
dynamics of stock prices and terms of trade at a partial and general equilibrium level.
2.1. The Economic Setting
The setting is almost exactly the same as in Pavlova and Rigobon (2007). We briefly recall
their main assumptions and results here. We consider a continuous-time pure-exchange world
economy with a finite horizon, [0, T]. We start with three countries in the world economy,
indexed by j E {0, 1, 2). Countries 0, 1 and 2 are assumed to be identical in size. (For ease
of reference, however, we refer to Country 0 as the Center country and Countries 1 and 2 as
the Periphery Colmtries). Each Country j has a strictly positive output process modeled as
a Lucas (1978) tree:
dYj(t) = py•j(t) Y3 (t) dt + aj (t) Y- (t) dw1 (t), j e {0, 1, 2}, (1)
where p4, and ay, > 0 are the respective processes for the mean growth rate and volatility of
output for Country j, and w0 is the independent Brownian motion representing an output or
supply shock to Country j . The price of the good produced by Country j is denoted by pi.
We define a numeraire basket containing 0 E (0, 1) unmits of the good produced in Comuntry 0
and (1 -P3)/2 units of each of the remaining two goods and normalize the price of this basket
to be equal to munity. We think of 3 as the size of the Center country relative to the world
economy. Given our assumption that all countries are identical in size, we therefore set P
equal to 5 in our model.
In order to complete markets, investment opportunities are represented by four securities.
Each Country j issues a stock SJ, a claim to its output. All stocks are in munit supply. There
is also the "world" bond B, which is riskless in units of the numeraire, and is in zero net
supply. We define the terms of trade from the viewpoint of the Center colmtry (Country
0): q1 - pl/pO and q2 - p2/p0 are the terms of trade of the Periphery countries 1 and 2,
respectively, with the Center country.
A representative consumer-investor of each country is endowed at time 0 with a supply of
the stock market of his country; the initial wealth of agent i is denoted by Wi(0). Each con-
suner i chooses nonnegative consulmption of each good (CO (t), Ci (t), C(t)), i E {0, 1, 2},
and a portfolio of the available risky securities xi(t) = (x 0 (t), m'(t), 2 (t))T, where x de-
notes a fraction of wealth Wi invested in security j. For the sake of tractability, preferences of
consumer i are represented by a time-additive log utility function defined over consumption
of all three goods:
E u(C°(t), / (t), C (t))dt ,
where
1 - lo 1 - aouo(C0, C1, C2) = aologCo(t)+ 1 alogcoC(t) + log C(t),
2 2
ui(C, C = 1- a((t) log(t)t) +ai(t]log it+ 1 -a 1 (t) logCOf(t),
S-1 (at) 1 - a (t)2 •, 1 - a 2(t) log C2(t) + log C(t) + a 2(t) log C2 (t).
We set the preference weight on the domestically-produced good, aj, to be greater than
1/3 (and less than 1), for each Country i. This is in order to generate a home bias in
preferences. We also include demand shifts as a key source of imcertainty in our model4. In
particular, an increase in a, in our model represents a demand shift towards domestically
produced goods in Colmtry i. We take each ai to be a martingale (i.e., E[ai(s)lFt] =
4Demand shifts are modeled along the lines of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977). In particuflar, in
the absence of demand shocks, free trade in goods would imply extremely high correlation of stock markets
and therefore irrelevancy of financial structure, as established by Helpman and Razin (1978), Cole and
Obstfeld (1991) and Zapatero (1995).
ai(t), s > t), and hence can be represented as
dail(t) = a, (t) TdW(t), da2(t)= a 2 (t)Tdw(t).
We keep the preference parameter of the Center country, a0o, fixed, in order to keep the focus
on the Periphery Countries.
2.2. Countries' Optimization and Benchmark Unconstrained Equi-
librium
In an environment with no portfolio constraints, we have the following results reported from
Pavlova and Rigobon (2007).
Proposition 1. (i) We can define a representative agent who is endowed with the aggregate
supply of securities and consumes the aggregate output. His utility is given by
U(CO, C 1 , C2; Ao0, A1, A2) = E [jTu(C(t), Cl(t), C2(t); A), A1, A2)dt
with
2
u(C0, C1, C2; , 1, 2) = max Ai hus(Ci, Ce l ' C)
E2 o C•-=C ,j{o0,1,2} i=o
where Ai > 0, i = 0, 1, 2, are the weights on consumers 0, 1, and 2, respectively. These
weights are constant in the unconstrained economy, but will be stochastic in the economy
with portfolio constraints. In the unconstrained case, these weights are simply the inverses
of the Lagrange multipliers on the consumers' intertemporal budget constraints. Since in
equilibrium these multipliers, and hence the weights, cannot be individually determined, we
adopt a normalization Ao = 1.
(ii) Terms of trade are given by the relevant marginal rates of substitution processes
ucl(Yo(t), Y'(t), y 2 (t); A1, A2) 1`0 + Aa (t) + A2 1-a2(t) yo(tq' (t)2 (2)
uco(Y 0 (t), Y (t), Y2 (t); A1 , A2) a0 + A11-al(t) + A2 1-C(t) yl(t) '
q2(t) 2(Y(t), yl(t), Y 2 (t); A1, A2 ) +-c  A1  ) + A2a 2 (t) Y 0 (t)S2(t 2 (3)
uco(Yo(t), Yl(t), Y 2(t); A1, A2) a0 +A l1(t) +A 2 1-a2(t) y2(t)'
(iii) The prices of the stocks of the Center and the Periphery countries are given by
So(t)(t + Yo(t)(T - t), (4)
P + q(t) + et q2(t
Sl(t) q(t) (t) Y(t)(T - t), (5)
S+- q1(t)+ --q2(t)
S2(t) (t) y2 (t)(T - t). (6)
,3 + 1-- ql(t ) + -q2(t)
(iv) Wealth distribution is constant, determined only by the initial shareholdings:
W, (t) W2(t)
Wo(t) Wo(t)
(v) In the unconstrained equilibrium, all agents hold an equal number of shares of stocks SO,
S1, and S 2. This number is given by x , where Ao = 1. No shares of the bond are held
in equilibrium.
(vi) The joint dynamics of the terms of trade and the three stock markets in the benchmark
unconstrained economy, (suppressing the drift term), are given by
q t
dSl"t
dS 2
= I(t)dt +
a(t) b(t) 1 -1 0
6(t) b(t) 1 0 -1
-Xa, (t) -Xb ,(t) ,M(t) j
a(t) - X,(t)- Xt) - X,(ti) lM(t) 2 q(t) 2 q1(t)
•(t)-x,,(t) b(t)-X,c 0, PM(t) ••t~ L•f
dal(t)
dC2Z(t)
aoy (t)dw (t)
uy (t)dw (t)
01y2(t) dW2 (t)
e (t)
The drift term I and quantities Xc,, Xa2, M, a, ii, b, and b are defined in Pavlova and
Rigobon (2007).
2.3. Volatility Constraints
Here, we specify that the Center country now faces a constraint on the volatility of its stock
portfolio. We make the plausible assumption that the constraint is placed on the portfolio
of a representative financial institution, such as a commercial bank, in this country. As
described in Section 1, the reasoning behind this choice of constraint is that a restriction
on volatility is very similar to a limit on portfolio Value-at-Risk (VAR), but is far more
tractable to model. In particular, VAR is a risk measure used by banks across the world,
which calculates the worst expected loss of a portfolio over a given horizon at a particular
confidence level. Therefore, a constraint on VAR is a limit on the downside risk of a portfolio,
whereas a volatility constraint simply restricts overall risk5 .
5We recognize here that we do not model separate sets of investors or economic agents in Country 0 who
are constrained, and do not get into exact details as to why a VAR constraint, or its proxy, a volatility
constraint, may be imposed. It is important to stress, however, that VAR limits are a very realistic example
of financial restrictions facing institutions across the globe, given that they fhnction as a tool for controlling
risk. For example, according to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) report, the Basel
Committee stipulates that international commercial banks should use VAR as an internal risk measure,
Suppose we then have the following, exogenously set dynamiceconstraint on the volatility
of Country O's portfolio x0, (where a represents the volatility matrix of all stock returns in
the economy).
Xo(t) T (t)a(t)TXo(t) < 0(t). (8)
Equation (8) thus provides us with the exact form of the constraint we are going to use when
analyzing the properties of general equilibrium in the economy with volatility limits. We
assume a daily7horizon here for changes in the degree of the volatility constraint, 0(t), over
time.
3. Equilibrium in the Economy with Volatility Con-
straints
We now describe general equilibrium under the specific volatility constraint considered in
Section 2.3. As described in Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), in a constrained economy, the only
change to be made to Proposition 1 is that the representative agent must now be defined using
stochastic weighting processes, (introduced by Cuoco and He (2001)), with these stochastic
subject to the fulfillment of certain sets of conditions and the approval of their supervisory committees.
Under these circumnstances, banks have no choice but to comply with this regulation, allowing us to justify
the imposition of a VAR or volatility restriction on a representative financial institution, or commercial bank,
in Country 0.
6We can rely on a wealth of evidence from current practices to support the assumption of a stochastic
limit on portfolio VAR or volatility. For example, dynamic VAR constraints are often used by banks and
firms to help set position limits for traders, as well as to trim the risk of different business units of a
corporation. These VAR limits are stochastic because they are usually tied to movements of the market.
For instance, if market volatility increases, more stringent controls on risk may have to be imposed via
tighter VAR constraints, so that financial positions are scaled down appropriately. (On the other hand,
if market volatility jumps up suddenly, a risk manager may alternatively want to relax his VAR limits to
avoid a liquidation under difficult market conditions; thus, the implementation and flexibility of dynamic
restrictions always depends on the judgement of the risk manager).
7Relating this to actual practice, we note that dynamic VAR limits, while used widely to control risk across
all financial institutions, firms and banks, are best suited to fast-paced trading environments where turnover
is rapid, leverage is high, and portfolio positions change several times a day, (see Jorion (2000)). These
environments are most prevalent in commercial banks, which usually have high turnover and liquidity in their
portfolios, and thus need to adjust risk exposure frequently. Furthermore, a daily horizon is most commonly
used by commercial banks across the world in order to calculate trading VARs, (with the added advantage
that a daily VAR is consistent and easily comparable with daily profit and loss measures). Therefore, we can
justify our assumption here that a daily volatility constraint, (as a proxy for a daily VAR limit), is placed
on the portfolio of a representative commercial bank in Country 0
weights representing the effects of the new constraint s . The following results are reported
from Pavlova and Rigobon (2007).
Proposition 2. (i) In an equilibrium with the portfolio constraint, the weighting processes
A1 and A2 are the same up to a multiplicative constant, which we denote as A. The dynamics
of A are given below:
dA(t) = A(t)[r(t) - ro(t) + m(t)T (mo(t) - m(t))]dt - A(t)(mo(t) - m(t))T dw(t). (9)
where mo and ro are, respectively, the effective market price of risk and interest rate faced by
Country 0 due to the portfolio constrainP, and m and r are, respectively, the vector market
price of risk and interest rate of the unconstrained Periphery Countries.
(ii) When such an equilibrium exists, the joint dynamics of the terms of trade and three stock
markets in the economy with the portfolio constraint are given by
A(t)
= Ic(t)dt + -XA(t) O(t)
A(t) - XA(t)
A(t) - XA(t)
dA(t)
x(t)
dai(t)
da2(t)
ayo(t)dwo(t)
ryi (t)dw1(t)
ay2(t)dw2(t)
where A(t) - A1 (t), I,, A, A and Xx are reported in Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), and the
unconstrained dynamics matrix e,(t) is as defined in Proposition 1.
The only departure from the corresponding expression in the benchmark economy is in
the addition of the first, dA/A, term. Therefore, a movement in A represents a tightening
or a loosening of the portfolio constraint; this will be explored in greater detail later in this
section. Furthermore, given the definition of A in part (iv) of Proposition 1 in terms of the
Periphery countries' relative wealth, an increase (decrease) in lambda also reflects a wealth
8See, for example, Basak and Croitoru (2000), Basak and Cuoco (1998), and Shapiro (2002). For the
original solution method see Negishi (1960).
9The optimization problem of the Center under portfolio constraints is formally equivalent to a dual
problem with no constraints but with the Center facing a fictitious 'tilted' investment opportunity set
(Cvitani6 and Karatzas (1992)). Cvitanid and Karatzas show that the tilt in the fictitious investment
opportunity set is characterized by the multipliers on the portfolio constraints. Consequently, Country O's
market price of risk under the constraint, mo, and interest rate, ro (derived in the Appendix), differ from
those faced by the unconstrained investors in the Periphery; these are denoted respectively as m and r.
Given that the difference in investment opportunity sets faced by the Center and Periphery countries is due
to the presence of the portfolio constraint on Country 0, it is clear that all investors will only hold the same
portfolio in the unconstrained case, where the tilted market price of risk mo(t) coincides with m(t), and ro(t)
coincides with r(t).
dq'(t)
de2 (t)
"I(t)dS(tS()(t)
dS'(t)
dS (t)
transfer in the world economy to (away from) the Periphery countries. This mechanism of
endogenous wealth transfers is the channel through which changes in A affect the tightness
of the portfolio constraint in our model'0 .
We can now define all equilibrium quantities in our constrained setting.
equations required to do this is presented in the following proposition.
The set of
Proposition 3. When equilibrium exists, the equilibrium market price of risk processes faced
by the Center and the Periphery are related as follows:
When zo(t)Ta(t)u(t)t)xo(t) = m(t)Tm(t) < 0(t),
mo(t) = m(t), V)(t) = 0, (Constraint not binding), (10)
otherwise,
mo(t)
(1 + 2 (t))2
m(t)
1 + 21(t)
Sm(t) T m(t)
- S(t) , (Constraint binding),
where tp is the multiplier on the volatility constraint, and a is the volatility matrix of the
three stock returns in the economy; see Pavlova and Rigobon (2007). Furthermore,
ayo (t)io - to + AX (t)L + ^2(t) 12
= X(t)(m(t) - o(t)) + XA,(t)a" (t) + XA2 (t)a1,(t)
+ 2 M(t) (ql(t) + q2(t)) oi(t) io M(t)ql(t)aoi(t) il
-1 M(t)q2(t)ay2 (t) i2 + mo(t).2 (12)
where io - (1, 0, 0 )T, i1 E (0, 1, 0)T, and i2  (0, 0, 1)T
Equations (10)-(11) are the complementary slackness conditions from the constrained
portfolio optimization of the Center country. When the portfolio volatility constraint is
not binding, the market price of risk faced by the Center coincides with that faced by the
Periphery countries. Therefore, the portfolio of the Center is equivalent to the Periphery
1 0For other papers which explore contagion as a wealth effect, see Kyle and Xiong (2001) and Cochrane,
Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2008).
(11)
P 0.003
C• 0.75 Y°(t) 1.0 ao(t) 0.1
a•l 0.75 yl(t) 1.0 oary(t) 0.1
C2  0.75 Y (t) 1.0 ay2(t) 0.1
Al (t) E [0.75, 1.25]
A2(t) E [0.75,1.25]
a, (t) (0, 0.2, 0)
at2 (t) (0, 0, 0.2)
Table 1: Parameter choices
countries' Imconstrained portfolios. When the constraint is binding, however, there is now a
difference between the market prices of risk faced by the Center and the Periphery, expressed
in (11). Equation (12) is derived from market clearing in the consumption goods.
Finally, given (10)-(11), we can derive an analogous result to (v) of Proposition 1 in the
constrained environment. This provides us with the justification for our assumption that all
three countries are identical in size in our model:
Corollary 4. In the constrained equilibrium, all agents still hold an equal number of shares
of stocks So, S1, and S'. Their holdings of the bond, however, are different, although by
assumption, net demand = net supply = 0 in equilibrium.
The relationship between A and the multiplier on the volatility constraint 0i, (or in other
words, the link between A and the tightness of the portfolio volatility constraint), can be
expressed in a simple plot, Figure 1. Here, we fix all time-dependent/state variables in
our model, except for the wealth shares of the Periphery countries, Al(t) and A2 (t). The
horizontal axes measure A1 and A2 and the vertical axis measures ik. The parameters used
in the analysis are summarized in Table 1.
From Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), the reasoning behind the choice of these parameters
is described as follows. In our model, as previously mentioned, all three countries in the
world are identical in size, so in the numeraire consumption basket they each represent 1 of
the world. We set 75 percent as the share of expenditures on the domestic good, which is a
conservative estimate given the share of the service sector in GDP. It is also found that in the
data, demand shocks are positively correlated with domestic supply innovations. Therefore,
we assume that a demand shift in Country j has a positive loading on wj and zero loadings
on the remaining Brownian motions.
We can observe from Figure 1 that roughly along the diagonal of the horizontal plane,
where A1 is equal or close to As in magnitude, the volatility constraint does not bind, and
the multiplier Vb is zero. This is our unconstrained region. As A1 and A2 diverge from each
other, however, the constraint does become more binding and the multiplier increases. This
means that the constraint on the volatility of the Center country's portfolio becomes tighter
as A1 and As become increasingly different, or as the relative wealth shares of the two other
countries in the world diverge. These results make sense; indeed, given that we are imposing
a volatility constraint on the portfolio, or, equivalently, on the overall wealth of Country 0,
it is natural to expect that this constraint would become more (less) binding as the wealth
flows of Country 0 to and from Countries 1 and 2 diverge from (converge to) each other,
or as Countries 1 and 2 diverge (converge) in relative wealth. Given that in equilibrium A1
and A2 are the same up to a multiplicative constant, which we denote as A, Figure 1 thus
displays how movements in A1, A2, and therefore A, tighten or loosen our portfolio constraint.
In particular, as A1 and A2 diverge (converge), the absolute magnitude of A will diverge from
(converge to) 1, and this will consequently make the volatility constraint tighter (looser) in
our model.
Figure 1: Value of the multiplier on the portfolio volatility constraint 0L
4. Empirical Estimation
In this section we estimate the contagious effect derived from the US sub-prime crisis, (now
taking the US to be the Center or constrained country in our model). The sub-prime crisis
has had small output effects from the beginning of 2007 until February 2008. However, it has
had a large effect on financial markets. One of the implications of the sub-prime meltdown
is the tightening of cash constraints in the US financial system, which can be interpreted as
a tightening of the portfolio risk constraint in our model, or a change in A. Of course, this
is an oversimplification. Nevertheless, by taking our model literally and estimating it in the
data during the sub-prime collapse, we are in effect measuring the contagion generated by
such a crisis due to the tightening of portfolio constraints.
Our model is extremely difficult to estimate in the data given that we would need to
observe both output and consumption, as well as asset prices, at high frequencies. In par-
ticular, as discussed in the introduction, the effects of the crisis on stock markets have been
relatively short lived. Therefore, these effects would be undetectable at the lower frequencies
at which output is typically observed. In this section, we thus make some simplifications to
the model in order to take it to the data.
We extend our model to inchlde N+1 countries. Manipulating part (ii) of Proposition 2,
we can express the joint dynamics of all relative asset prices in the economy as follows:
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and where the vectors {da, (t), ... , da,(t)}' and {oaro(t)dwo(t), ... , an(t)dwn(t)}' represent
all the demand and supply shocks in the economies.
We make several assumptions here regarding the demand and supply shocks in this
economy. Firstly, we have already assumed that the supply shocks or Brownian motions are
independent across countries. Secondly, we have assumed that the demand shocks are linear
functions of the supply shocks that have different loadings on each shock. Furthermore, we
note that 8,(t) has exactly the same loading for all countries on the demand shocks, while the
loadings on the supply shocks are different across all countries. This means that the product
of e,(t) and the demand and supply shocks is a linear function that will have different
loadings on every supply shock for each of the N+1 colmtries in the economy. Finally, any
change in (A), (equivalent to a tightening or loosening of the portfolio volatility constraint),
depends on both the supply shocks and also on changes in the degree of the constraint.
Tracking the impact of any particular supply shock becomes, therefore, a very difficult
empirical exercise, given that the total effect is a convolution of supply, demand, and portfolio
constraint dynamics. In order to tackle this problem, let us consider a change in the tightness
of the portfolio constraint, or a change in (A), when all the country supply shocks are zero. In
this case, an increase in the tightening of the constraint shifts A, and this change is reflected
equally in all relative asset prices, (given that the loading on changes in A, -XA(t), is the
same for all countries in the model). Thus, an alternative to estimating the impact of a
tightening of the constraint is to find periods in time in which just the constraint shifts. The
impact of the constraint will then be equal to the average change in all relative asset prices
at that time. This method involves making a very strong assumption, however, given that
supply shocks are unlikely to be zero at any point in time.
Nevertheless, the same intuition can be used if we think about shifts in second moments
instead. As can be inferred from part (i) of Proposition 2, shocks to the degree of tightening
of the constraint change the conditional heteroscedasticity of the A process. Let us now
assume that shocks to the output supply for all countries are homoscedastic. If this is the
case, then any heteroscedasticity observed across relative asset prices has to be explained by
changes in the portfolio constraint factor. Therefore, just estimating this heteroscedasticity
would be a measure of the contagious effect of the portfolio constraint. Once again, the
assumption that all supply shocks are homoscedastic is a strong one. However, given we
have assumed that the supply shocks are independent across countries, if we are instead
willing to make the assumption that these shocks are heteroscedastic, but their conditional
heteroscedasticity is independent across countries as well, then we can estimate the impact
of the portfolio constraint as the average change in the heteroscedasticity of all moments of
relative stock prices.
More precisely, if a change in the tightening of the portfolio constraint shifts , then
all variances and covariances across all countries will shift exactly by a factor of XI,(t) •
var . If a supply shock is heteroscedastic, on the other hand, then some variances and
covariances between relative asset prices will increase in response, while others will decrease.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the increases and decreases will vary across countries as a
result of any supply shock. However, if the heteroscedasticity of supply shocks is independent
across countries, (meaning that the average change in the variance of supply shocks across
all countries is equal to zero), then the average change in covariance of relative asset prices
coming from supply shocks will be equal to zero as well.
In summary then, the change in the tightening of the portfolio constraint implies a shift
in second moments that is common to all pairs in the data, assuming that all stock markets
are measured in the same currency. Supply shocks do not share this property. We use this
difference to implement our estimator of contagion. Denote the covariance matrix of all
relative stock prices as
Ot = covar
so(t)
S'o(t)
ds_(t _ dq'(t)
S'(t) q'(t)
dS2(t) _ dq2(t)
S2 (t) q2(t)
dSn(t) dq-(t)S- (t) qn Wt
then, the average change in all the elements of Qt is proportional to the change in variance
of At) induced by a change in the tightening of the portfolio constraint. The average
covariance change of relative asset prices is thus our new contagion measure at any point in
time.
Although the assumptions required to rationalize this measure of contagion are strong,
(namely, output shocks are independent and their conditional volatility is also independent
across countries), its implementation is extremely simple. The first step is to compute all
stock markets in one common currency, (we use the US dollar as our base). Secondly, we
estimate the covariance matrix displayed above at a daily frequency using a rolling window;
the justification for this methodology is provided shortly. (Given that we have assumed a
dynamic daily portfolio constraint, we need to use a time horizon of one day in our contagion
estimation procedure). Thirdly, we estimate the daily change in the average of all the
elements in this covariance matrix in order to identify changes in the constraint, and thus
contagion, over time.
4.1. Description of the Data
The data we have collected on global stock markets and exchange ratesn1 in order to estimate
our covariance matrix originates from DataStream 4.0. Daily stock market data was obtained
from the " DataStream Total Market" index for each country listed in the database, (there
were 51 countries in total reporting this index), both in US dollars and local currency, from
February 9th 2007 to February 11th 2008. The US dollar and local currency values of the
stock market index for each country were then used to calculate individual exchange rates.
For countries which did not report the "DataStream Total Market" index in both US dollars
and their local currency, daily spot exchange rates were downloaded instead.
The full list of countries reporting daily stock market index data from DataStream
comprises, (in alphabetic order): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Coluhnnmbia, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxem-
bourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines,
11Strictly speaking, given that we are taking our common currency to be the US dollar, in order to compute
the global covariance of relative asset prices we need daily data on the terms of trade, or the relative price of
a representative consumption basket, for all other countries in the world relative to the US. It is not possible,
however, to obtain data on global terms of trade at a daily frequency, meaning that we have to use daily
exchange rate data instead
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of Amer-
ica and Venezuela.
Two of these countries, Columbia and Venezuela, were dropped from our sample due to
inadequate exchange rate data, leaving us with 49 countries in total.
4.2. Contagion Measure
We implement our contagion estimator from February to October 2007. This is a period
of time during which news about the sub-prime crisis dominated financial markets in the
US. We estimate the daily covariance matrix for relative asset prices across all countries,
(measuring stock prices in US dollars), using a rolling window of 5 days. (We also estimate
the covariance matrix using 10 and 20 day rolling windows and the results are qualitatively
the same. Our preferred specification uses the highest frequency possible.) 12 Using the rolling
window we then compute the change in the average of all the elements of the covariance
matrix from day to day. We depict the results in Figure 2. We also present the conditional
daily standard deviation of the US stock market, computed using the same 5 day rolling
window, for discussion purposes only. All daily stock market and exchange rate data is
measured in logs.
It is interesting to compare our measure of contagion to the stock market standard
deviation in the US. Clearly, the sub-prime crisis was a shock which originated in the US,
and therefore it may initially make sense to use the US stock market volatility as a measure
of the size of that shock. However, that would be incorrect, given that the US stock markets
have been hit by a multitude of shocks which may not have been propagated with the same
intensity to other countries. For instance, the implicit expected monetary policy response
to the sub-prime crisis has been accounted for in the US markets, but might not have
12One important question is if we can compute the daily implied variance-covariance matrix for relative
asset prices from the data. Unfortunately we cannot, and thus have to use a rolling window to estimate
covariances instead. In particular, we may have daily information about implied volatility in some countries
from options on the stock market indices, but we certainly do not have information that we could use to
estimate daily covariances. It is also worth highlighting that we cannot estimate the conditional variance-
covariance matrix in our case either. The reason is that we are allowing the covariance terms across countries
to be as unrestricted as possible, and are just using their average shift to estimate contagion.
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Figure 2: Contagion Measure and Rolling Standard Deviation of US Stock Market.
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been reflected in other countries. Furthermore, fiscal packages in the US will have affected
US asset prices, but might not have been accounted for to the same degree elsewhere in
the world. Our estimator of contagion, however, captures exclusively the increase in co-
movement across asset prices that is compolmded from all sources of shocks in the US; these
include the automatic responses, and the surprise responses as well, of fiscal and monetary
policy.
Interestingly, even though in the figure our measure of contagion and the US stock market
standard deviation appear to be correlated, their correlation in levels is only 52.9 percent,
and -2.8 percent in changes. In other words, these variables do indeed appear to be measuring
very different aspects of the US sub-prime crisis.
In Figure 2 we can clearly see two major instances in which the contagion measure
increased significantly. One event starts in February 26th, 2007, and the other starts after
July 19th, 2007. In Figure 3 we present all 49 stock market prices measured in dollars and
normalized to have a price of one on February 26th of 2007; the scale for all stock market
prices is displayed on the left vertical axis of the graph. The corresponding scale for the
contagion measure, represented by the separate thick line in the chart, is displayed on the
right vertical axis. The idea here is to observe the co-movement of stock prices globally,
and how it increases, when our contagion estimator increases. We notice that except for
a few countries, all stock markets in the world collapse together immediately following the
February 26th event, and our contagion measure increases sharply at the same time. The
opposite trend can be observed around the beginning of the second week of March, when
stock markets start to pick up again and diverge from each other, and our contagion measure
drops at the same time. Therefore, there appears to be a strong positive correlation here
between changes in the contagion estimator and co-movement of stock prices across the
globe, following the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis.
Figure 4 presents the same exercise for the July 19th event. In the first case in February,
our measure of contagion increases from an average of 0.29 to a maximum of 2.37. During
the July 19th event, the average is 0.39 and increases to 6.42. Because the same methodology
is used throughout, we can therefore say that the second event is more contagious, in the
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Figure 3: Sub-prime Crisis: February Contagious Event.
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sense that the sub-prime shock should increase the degree of co-movement across countries
much more. Indeed, not surprisingly, asset prices do appear to co-move with higher intensity
after the shock in July 19th, than after the corresponding shock in February. Furthermore,
we observe that the same positive relationship between changes in the contagion estimator
and co-movement of stock prices holds for the July contagious event as well, now magnified
to an even greater extent.
4.3. Sub-prime News
An alternative measure of the "size" of the sub-prime shock is to compute the number of news
articles that have appeared in world newspapers about the sub-prime crisis. We obtained
this data from the Lexis-Nexis Academic search engine, using the search prompt "subprime"
OR "sub-prime", for four distinct media groups: US Newspapers and Wires, Major World
Newspapers, Wire Services Stories (All Wires), and News, All (English, Full Text). The
total numnber of articles and/or wires found in accord with these prompts was recorded on a
daily basis from January 1st 2007 to February 19th 2008. In Figure 5 we present the actual
numbers of articles that mention the sub-prime crisis from these four different sources of
news. Obviously the series are highly correlated and present a very clear pattern: when the
sub-prime crisis becomes an important issue, then newspapers tend to report more articles
about the crisis. 13
Figure 6 presents the number of news articles (in logs) together with our measure of
contagion and the rolling standard deviation of the US stock market. (The scale for the
contagion measure and the US stock market standard deviation is displayed on the left
vertical axis of the graph, and the scale for the news is on the right vertical axis). Once
again, we focus on the period February to October 2007. As can easily be seen, there is a
significantly positive correlation between changes in our estimator of contagion and changes
in the actual mnmber of daily news articles reporting the sub-prime crisis. For instance, the
simple daily correlation between our contagion measure and the number of news articles is
13We are presenting the data only for the weekdays. During the weekends there is a significant decline in
the number of news articles reported; hence, there is weekly seasonality that does not appear in the figure.
We decided to drop those observations as opposed to including them as news for the following Monday.
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Figure 4: Sub-prime Crisis: July Contagious Event.
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11.8 percent, (in first differences), but the corresponding correlation in changes between the
US stock market standard deviation and the number of news articles (contagion measure)
drops to only 2.6 (-2.8) percent.
Following on from this, we also specifically evaluate our contagion measure's predictive
power on the news reported, and its changes, at different horizons in a regression based
framework. In particular, one would expect that when our contagion estimator increases,
there should be an increase in the munber of news articles documenting the sub-prime crisis.
We measure news in changes of logs and contagion in changes of our estimator. The results
from the regression over the period February to October 2007, (with leads and lags of our
contagion measure included for robustness), are presented in Table 2. Here, one observes
that very few of the coefficients on changes in the contagion measure are statistically or
economically different from zero. Indeed, just about less than 5 percent of the coefficients
are statistically different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. However, in Table 3
we present the p-values from the F-test that all the coefficients on contagion are zero. As
can be seen, these hypotheses are strongly rejected after at least one lag of the contagion
measure is included in the regression. Furthermore, the higher the unumber of leads and lags
included in our specification, the stronger the total cumulative effect of contagion generally
becomes. For example, one can see that the p-values from the F-test monotonically decrease
as the number of lags increases, (keeping the number of leads constant at zero). Moreover,
as the number of leads and lags increase together from 1 to 10, p-values again decrease,
and the sum of coefficients on contagion monotonically increases from 0.056 to 0.292. This
means that when we include 10 leads and lags of the contagion estimator in our regression
specification, the total cumulative effect of a one percentage increase in contagion, on any
day, is a 0.29 percentage increase in the (log) nmnnber of news articles from that day to
the next. The corresponding percentage increase in (log) news with only 1 lead and lag of
contagion is, however, much lower, at arolmd 0.06 percent.
The inclusion of lags and leads of the contagion measure in our estimation is not entirely
unreasonable, especially given that we estimate contagion using a rolling window. In partic-
ular, some of the stock markets across the world may register the effects of contagion a day
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Table 2: Estimates of coefficients of changes in (log) news on changes in our contagion measure for different leads
contagion, February - October 2007. Standard Deviations below the estimated coefficients.
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Leads Lags Sum of Coefficients p-values
0 0 0.02655 9.2%
0 1 0.03295 4.9%
0 2 0.03813 2.6%
0 3 0.02892 1.0%
0 4 0.03795 0.5%
0 5 0.02946 0.3%
0 6 0.04685 0.0%
0 7 0.06538 0.0%
0 8 0.07547 0.0%
0 9 0.10635 0.0%
0 10 0.13024 0.0%
1 1 0.05558 0.4%
2 2 0.08389 0.0%
3 3 0.09956 0.0%
4 4 0.15045 0.0%
5 5 0.15696 0.0%
6 6 0.16997 0.0%
7 7 0.18833 0.0%
8 8 0.20214 0.0%
9 9 0.27612 0.0%
10 10 0.29216 0.0%
Table 3: Total cumulative effect of changes in our contagion measure on the change in (log)
news, February - October 2007.
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later than the shock originated in the US, and global newspapers also usually report their
news a day later than the corresponding market suffered the shock. For all these reasons, it is
not surprising that the significance and effect, (i.e. the size of the coefficient on the contagion
measure), increase with the horizon used. Another interesting aspect of the estimation here
is that the contagion coefficient which is usually significant is the contemporaneous one. For
instance, in Figure 7 we present the estimated coefficients on the contagion measure with two
95 percent confidence bands. We show the case with 10 leads and 10 lags of the contagion
estimator; the negative mlnbers to the left on the x-axis represent the leads, while the 10
coefficients to the right, (positive on the x-axis), are the lags of the contagion measure. We
observe here that (only) the contemporaneous coefficient on contagion is statistically differ-
ent from zero at the 5 percent level. This suggests that when we include both 10 leads as well
as 10 lags of contagion, an increase in contagion at any point in time produces a statistically
significant increase in the number of (log) news articles reported about the sub-prime crisis
at the same point in time. Moreover, when we compute the F-test for this specification, the
significance of the total cumulative effect of contagion is tremendously high, as we already
saw in Table 3.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, our paper develops a measure of international financial contagion which is
derived from the cross-equation restrictions of a model with portfolio constraints. This
semi-structural estimation procedure generates a contagion measure which, under certain
assumptions about the first and second moments of output shocks, reflects the average
change in the joint covariance of all countries in the world with each other. Therefore, our
estimator of contagion here differs from standard contagion measures which just focus on
calculating the covariance between a 'constrained' country, or the country which suffers an
initial shock, (in the case of the sub-prime crisis, this would be the US), and other countries
in the world.
In our empirical tests, we demonstrate that changes in our new global contagion estimator
are positively correlated with changes in the number of daily news articles documenting the
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Figure 7: Estimated coefficients on contagion measure for the case with 10 leads and 10 lags, February - October 2007. Dotted
lines represent the 95 percent confidence bands.
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sub-prime crisis. This correlation is far higher than the corresponding correlation between
changes in our contagion measure and changes in the standard deviation of the US stock
market, and also between changes in the number of news articles and changes in the standard
deviation of the US stock market. These results indicate that the US stock market variance
does not measure the degree of the sub-prime crisis to the same extent as either our contagion
measure or the vohnne of news. Furthermore, there is evidence here that our estimator of
contagion is itself a strong measure of the sub-prime crisis. These findings are further
reinforced by the fact that there appears to be a positive relationship between changes in
our contagion measure and co-movement of stock prices across the globe following the sub-
prime collapse. Finally, we obtain the result that our estimator of contagion has a highly
significant total cumulative effect on changes in the number of news articles reporting the
crisis. For example, when we include up to ten leads and lags of the contagion measure,
in a regression of changes in news articles on changes in the contagion measure, the minull
hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero is rejected very strongly at the 5 percent
level. Moreover, the contemporaneous coefficient on contagion is significantly positive at the
5 percent level.
In sum, these findings reveal that our estimator of contagion is indeed a robust measure,
and even predictor, of the sub-prime crisis. The implication from our empirical analysis is
then that we can explain the spread of international financial contagion due to the sub-prime
collapse, at least to a certain extent, via the tightening of financial constraints facing banks
or institutions in the US. This result, as well as the new estimation procedure for contagion
introduced in the paper, represents our most important contribution to the literature.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2 See Pavlova and Rigobon (2007)
Proof of Proposition 3 Proposition 3 can be proved as follows. Let us consider the
partial optimization problem of Country 0 , where the representative agent is maximizing his
expected utility over trading strategies x0o(t), subject to the constraint in (8). In particular,
from Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), we can represent the objective function of country 0 in
the form
E [log Wo(t) - K(t)] dt.
where K(t) = ao log(p0(t)(T - t)) + La log(pl(t)(T - t)) + F1- log(p2(t)(T - t)). The
investor of country 0 takes prices in the good markets pi, j = 0, 1, 2 as given, and hence
from his viewpoint K(t) is exogenous at any time t. Therefore, the constrained maximization
problem for the Center Country reduces to the following:
max EI log Wo(t)d] (A.1)
subject to xo(t)Ta(t)a(t)Txo(t) < 0(t). (A.2)
Since we know that, for Country 0:
dWo(t) = Wo(t)[(r(t)l + xo(t)T (p(t) - r(t)l)dt + (zo(t) T (t))dw(t)], (A.3)
(where iu(t) and c(t) are, respectively, the vector of expected stock returns and the
volatility matrix of the investment opportunity set), then it follows from (A.3) that:
dlog Wo(t) = [(r(t)1 + xo(t)T (p/ (t) - r(t)1) - ~jxo(t)T a (t)12)dt + xo(t)To(t)dw(tl k.4)
Wo(t) = WoV(O)efo(r(t)l+xo(t)T(p(t)-r(t)1)- 1 JXO(t) T o(t)J2 )dt + Jf Xo(t)T a (t)dw(t) (A.5)
Therefore, if we assume in addition that x 0 (t)T a (t) E (H2 )3 ,(the set of square-integrable
processes),so that E [fSo Xo(t)T (t)dw(t)] = 0, then substituting (A.4) into (A.1) implies
that (A.1) reduces to the following problem:
max [ TX0(t) T (t(t) - r(t)1) - Ixo(t)Ta(t)12dt] (A.6)
subject to Xo(t)Ta(t)a(t)Txo(t) < 0(t) (A.7)
where i is the multiplier on the volatility constraint above (so that b = 0 when the
constraint is not binding).
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The first order conditions from (A.6) at time t imply that:
a-l(t)Tm(t)
xo(t) = 11 + 21
where mr(t) = a(t)-'(A(t) - r(t)).
Now using the fact, from Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), that the
folios of risky assets are given by:
(A.8)
countries' optimal port-
xo(t) = (a(t)T)-lmo(t), xz(t) = (a(t)T)-lm(t), i E {1, 2}.
we can solve for mo(t) by reexpressing (A.8) as:
mo(t) = a(t)TXo(t) = m(t)1 + 27 (A.9)
Substituting (A.8) into (8),(with the inequality constraint binding now as an equality),
we can solve for 0(t):
m(t)Tm(t)
¢(t)
20(t) = 0
(Constraint binding) (A.10)
(A.11)(Constraint not binding)
Therefore, to summarize, in the case where the constraint is not binding , 0(t) = 0 ,
and therefore mo(t) = m(t). This is reported in (10). In the case where the constraint is
binding,(A.9) and (A.10) give us the complementary slackness conditions presented in (11).
Equation (12) follows from market clearing, coupled with the investors' first-order conditions.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 4. We first present the proof of Corollary 4, and show that the
analogous result in the unconstrained environment, i.e. result (v) of Proposition 1, is just
a special case of this. Consider Country O's portfolio. From (iii) of Proposition 1, and
expressions for optimal consumption allocations and sharing rules for aggregate endowment
from Pavlova and Rigobon (2007), we have:
So(t) = po(t)YO(t)(T- t)
Sl(t) = pl(t)yl(t)(T- t)
1
= (t)(Tt)aoWo(t) =
1 o1 - a0
= (t)(T-Wo(t) =) 2
pl(t)(T - t) 2
YO(t)
Y'A(t) 1 - ao
1-0 + Alil(t) + A2 lc2W 2
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cO(t)
o (t)
(1 + 2 (t))2
Therefore, after some manipulation:
Wo(t) 1
SO(t) ao + A (t) + A2 1 2(t)
Wo(t) 1
Sx(t) -C 1 +(at(t) +,2 -++2(-aO + Alai (t)+ A2  2
Following the exact same procedure for the portfolios of Countries 1 and 2, we can report
the following results for the Countries' wealth as a proportion of stock prices. (Here, we just
present results for So and S1 for simplicity - the expressions for the Countries' wealth as a
proportion of the stock price S2 are derived analogously):
Wi (t) A1
Wx (t) X1
So(t) -a + AXal(t) + A2 -a2(t)
W2 (t) A2
S (t) + A-X-(t + A)2a2(t)
S2(t) - + + 2a2(t)
Therefore, letting Nj(t) be the nmaber of shares Country i holds in stock j, then we
have:
zi(t)Ti W (t)
Nj(t) = jSi(t) i = 0, 1, 2, j = 0, 1, 2, (A.12)
Using the securities market clearing equation for all stocks j, we also have:
N(t (t) + Nj(t)+ Nj(t) = 1 j = 0, 1, 2 (A.13)
Therefore, applying (A.12) and (A.13) for stocks 0 and 1,(i.e.for j = 0,1), we have:
1 = o(t)Tio + Xl(t)Ti°oA + x 2(t)Tio A2
1o + A1 -(t) + A2  (A.14)
1 o(t)Til + Xl(t)Til•A + x 2(t)Til 21 =1a2(t )  (A.15)
2 2
Now, from the expression above, (in the proof of Proposition 3), for countries' optimal
portfolios of risky assets, and equation (11), we can easily derive the following expression
for Country O's portfolio in terms of the portfolio of the periphery countries,(letting x(t) =
xW (t) = x2 (t) denote the portfolio held by each of the Periphery countries, given that these
will always be identical in both the constrained and unconstrained cases):
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xo(t) - (A.16)1 + 2¢
Therefore, using (A.16), (A.14) and (A.15) can be reexpressed as:
1 = xo(t)Tio(1 + (A1 + A2)(1+ 2V)) (A.17)
1 2 2(A.17)
1 o(t)T il(1 + (A1 + A2)(1 + 2V)) (A.18)
2-c• + Alai(t) + A2 1-2(t)
Using the above two equations, it follows directly that:
zo(t)Tio zo(t)Til (A.19)
ao + A1 1 ,t) + 2 1-a2 ) l-a + Alal(t) + A1- 2 ()
The left hand side of (A.19), is equal to No(t) , and the right hand side is equal to N (t),
i.e. we have shown that Country 0 holds the same number of shares in stocks 0 and 1. This
argument can be easily extended to show that Country 0 holds the same number of shares in
all stocks, (using the securities market clearing equation for S2 and manipulating in the same
way). The same logic applies to Countries 1 and 2. The proof of the analogous result for
the unconstrained setting is then just a special case of this argument with ib =0. Therefore,
in both the unconstrained and constrained settings, all countries hold an equal number of
shares in stocks 0, 1 and 2.
Furthermore, in the unconstrained case, since 0 = , it can also be shown very easily
from manipulating equations (A.12) and (A.13), (for all i and j), that for all Countries i and
Stocks j:
Nj,(t) Ao = 1 (A.20)
Ao + A1 + A2
In other words, when there is no constraint, the number of shares of each stock purchased
by any given Country is equal to its relative wealth share in the world economy. It follows
that in the benchmark equilibrium, agents in each Country invest all their wealth in their
respective stock portfolios. Therefore, no shares of the bond are traded in equilibrium. We
do not arrive at the same result in the constrained case, however, since we have the extra
term ?P appearing in equation (A.13) for all i and j , (implying that equation (A.20) no longer
holds). In this scenario, therefore, agents have different holdings of the bond in equilibrinm.
Q.E.D.
Derivation of ro (for Country 0) Equations (10) and (11) are derived at a partial
equilibrium level. The partial-equilibrium constrained optimization problem of country 0 is
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an example of the class of problems considered by Cvitani6d and Karatzas, (Cvitani6 and
Karatzas (1992)). In particular, as a result of the volatility constraint (8), portfolio values
x0 are restricted to lie in a closed, convex, non-empty subset K E R3 . We can define the
constraint set K as follows:
K = {xo(t); xo(t) T (t)ci(t)T xo(t) < 0(t)}.
As previously mentioned, the problem of Country 0 facing a portfolio constraint is equiv-
alent to a fictitious problem, based on a different financial market with no constraints. In
particular, this fictitious market is tilted, or rather, the (constrained) Center country's ef-
fective interest rate and the market price of risk, r0 and mo, are tilted to reflect the extent
to which the country's investments are constrained. Let this tilt be captured by a three-
dimensional vector of multipliers, v(t), so that for each process v(t), (in the set of processes
adapted to {Ft; t E [0, T]}), we define a fictitious market M", in which the three stocks and
the global bond are traded. Define the support function, 6(v(t)) as follows:
6(v(t)) = sup (-xo(t)TV(t))
zo(t)EK
We can also define the effective domain of the support function, K, as :
K = {v(t); 6(v(t)) 5 infinity}.
Now we can define the following tilted processes in the fictitious, unconstrained market :
ro(t) = r(t) + 6(v(t)) (A.21)
mo(t) = m(t) + a-'(t)v(t) (A.22)
d•"(t) = -ý'(t)[(r(t) + 6(v(t)))dt + (-l 1 (t)v(t) + m(t)T )dw(t)] (A.23)
Given the quadratic form of our constraint, and the definition of 6(v(t)) and K above,
we can easily solve for 6(v(t)) from a simple constrained minimization problem. We obtain:
6(v(t)) = (((t)v(t) T (a(t)a(t)T )- 1V(t))/ 2  v(t) E K. (A.24)
In the fictitious market characterized by v(t), Country 0 will maximize his expected
utility of consumption subject to his budget constraint,(with state price density process
(`(t) replacing ýo(t)). The dynamic portfolio choice problem in the fictitious market without
constraints, MY, can be equivalently expressed in a static form:
sQb SUP CC(TWo((t), C0 (t)) dt (A.25)
subject to E [(~"(T)Wo(T)] 5 Wo(0). (A.26)
110
where Q" is the value function defined in market Mv, (and we define / to be the multiplier
on the wealth constraint above). In addition, from Cvitanid and Karatzas, we also know that
for any admissible choice of v, the value function Q9 gives an upper bound for the optimal
value function of the original, constrained problem. Therefore, if we minimize the value
function of the fictitious problem,Q", with respect to v, (and the minimum corresponds to a
feasible trading policy), then we have found an optimal portfolio policy under the constraint
on Country 0. (Cvitanid and Karatzas outline sufficient conditions under which the solution
of the minimization problem exists and leads to the optimal portfolio policy, i.e. conditions
under which there is no duality gap).
Referring to the proof of Proposition 1, we can substitute Country O's log utility function
into (A.25) to obtain the following equivalence relation between the minimization problems:
min Q ' = min E sup log Wo(t)dt - Wo(T)~"v(T) = min U(~("(T))
K K LWo(t) 0 VEK
We can now form the Bellman equation for this problem, where the value function,
Q(t, y) is a function of t and state variable y, Q(T, y) = U(y), and y = OC"(t).(Here, we have
suppressed the dependence of y on t). Therefore, using (A.23) to obtain the drift of "'(t),
(which in turn determines the drift of y over time), the standard Bellman equation for this
problem is as follows:
1
min(Qt - yQj(6(v(t)) + r(t)) + -Q,,y 2 (m(t) + 0-l (t)v(t))2 ) =  (A.27)
vEK 2
Since we have a log utility function for Country 0, (which is a special case of a power
ftmction with curvature/elasticity of intertemporal substitution set equal to 1), the Value
function Q(t, y) solving (A.27) will take the following standard form:
Q(t,y) = log yf(t)
for some function of time, f(t).
In particular, for all power functions , yQy and y2Q, will be constant, so the optimal
v(t) from (A.27) will not depend on the state variable y. Therefore, equation (A.27) reduces
to the minimization problem below:
min((m(t) + ra-(t), (t))2 + 6(v(t)) = 0 (A.28)
vEK
Therefore, let v*(t) be the solution to (A.28) so that:
v*(t) = argmin((m(t) + a-l(t)v(t))2 + 6(v(t))
Substituting (A.24) into the above, we have, equivalently:
v*(t) = argmin((m(t) + c-'(t)v(t))2 + (q(t)v(t)T(u(t)o(t)T)-yV(t))1/ 2)
A nonzero solution to this minimization problem will exist if and only if the original
volatility constraint,(8), is binding, (so that, obviously, v* = 0 when Cotmtry 0 is uncon-
strained and does not face a fictitious set of investment opportlmities).
Let us consider the case where (8) is binding. From (A.22), we have :
v*(t) = o(t)(mo(t) - m(t)) (A.29)
Substituting (A.9) into (A.29), we obtain the following expression for v* in terms of the
multiplier ip(t):
-2¢(t)
1 + 2(t) (t) mr(t)= v*(t) (A.30)1 + 2?P(t)
From (A.22) and (A.24), we then have:
ro(t) = r(t) + (O(t)v*(t)T (a(t)u(t)T )-lv*(t)) 1/2  (A.31)
When (8) is not binding:
v*(t) = 0 (A.32)
mo(t) = m(t) (A.33)
ro(t) = r(t) (A.34)
Q.E.D.
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